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ABSTRACT
Although mortgage-backed securities ('MBS") and other financial
products that nearly caused the collapse of the global financial system could
not have been issued without attorneys, the legal profession's role in the
financial crisis has received relatively little scrutiny.
This Article focuses on lawyers' preparation of MBS offering
documents that misrepresented the lending practices of mortgage loan
originators. While attorneys may not have known that many MBS would
become toxic, they lacked incentives to inquire into the shoddy lending
practices of prominent originators, such as Washington Mutual Bank
('WaMu"), when they and their clients were reaping considerable profits
from MBS offerings.
The subprime era illustrates that attorneys are unreliable gatekeepers
of the financial markets because they will not necessarily acquire sufficient
information to assess the legality of the transactions they are facilitating.
The Article concludes by proposing that the Securities and Exchange
Commission impose heightened investigative duties on attorneys who work
on public offerings of securities.
'Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. J.D., Georgetown University
Law Center (2006); M.A., New York University (2003); B.A., Columbia University (2001). I would
like to thank Wayne Barnes, Donald Langevoort, Kevin Michels, Huyen Pham, Marc Steinberg, and
Brad Wendel for their invaluable comments on this article.
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INTRODUCTION
Although lawyers have played an integral role in the most high profile cases of
corporate fraud of the last forty years,2 the conduct of attorneys in connection with
the recent financial crisis has received relatively little attention. Attorneys, many of
them members of prestigious law firms, represented financial institutions engaged
in the purchase and sale of mortgage-backed securities ("MBS"), collateralized debt
obligations ("CDOs"), and other financial products that nearly caused a collapse of
the global financial system, but few of these attorneys have been implicated in any
misconduct.' Lawyers, like many of their clients, may not have appreciated the risks
associated with these investments.4
However, lawyers did not need to be especially knowledgeable about financial
products to understand the consequences of securitizing mortgages originated by
irresponsible lenders. 5 Financial institutions issued $3.1 trillion in MBS in 2003,
2 See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers'
Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 76-77 (1993); W. Bradley Wendel,
Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167, 1167 (2005) (suggesting that attorneys were
a "but-for cause" of accounting scandals of the early 2000s). The role of lawyers in Enron's bankruptcy
has received particular scrutiny and served as the impetus for significant changes in professional
' See Dustin A. Zacks, Robo-Litigation, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 867, 867 (2013) (discussing the
legal system's failure to discipline attorney misconduct attributable to the financial crisis). Courts have
criticized some attorneys for failing to ensure that mortgage notes were properly transferred prior to
being marketed and sold to investors. See U.S. Nat'l Bank Ass'n. v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 55-56
(Mass. 2011) (Cordy, J., concurring) (noting the "utter carelessness" with which banks documented their
ownership of mortgages); Robo-Singing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in
Mortgage Servicing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm.
on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 267 (2010) (statement of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
111hhrg63124/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg63124.pdf (criticizing bank attorneys for cutting corners and
engendering confusion with respect to mortgaged properties); Zacks supra (criticizing attorneys for
failing to vet their clients' documentary evidence in foreclosure proceedings).
4 See Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, Enterprise Risk, and
the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495, 498 (2012); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Role of Lawyers in
the Global Financial Crisis, 24 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 214, 218 (2010) (suggesting that the financial crisis
was caused by the complexity of many financial products and the overreliance on mathematical risk
models). Attorneys are generally not subject to discipline absent actual knowledge of their clients'
wrongdoing. See generally Rebecca Roiphe, The Ethics of Wilfl Ignorance, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 187, 196 (2011) (claiming that ethical rules predominately require actual knowledge of
wrongdoing and that willful ignorance is insufficient).
' The Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") require lawyers to present "unpleasant
facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 1 (2013); see also Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the
Securitization of U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 98 (2008) ("Where liability is found
based on knowledge of fraudulent lending practices it follows that the complacent party should have also
been aware of the risks associated with these assets. If securitizers knew that sub-prime lenders were
making bad loans, they must have known that the securities created from these loans were not stable
investments.").
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$1.8 trillion in 2004, and $2 trillion in each of 2005, 2006, and 2007,6 while
mortgage loan originators were often issuing home loans without assessing the
ability of borrowers to repay. 7 Even after prominent loan originators began to file
for bankruptcy in late 2006, financial institutions continued to conduct MBS
offerings.'
Some institutions, like Washington Mutual Bank, Inc. ("WaMu"), once one of
the largest banks in the United States, issued MBS and also originated many of the
problematic mortgages.9 WaMu misrepresented its loan underwriting standards to
MBS investors as well as its own stockholders.' When the real estate market
crashed, many of the mortgages issued by WaMu became toxic because borrowers
could not make payments on the underlying mortgages." Misleading statements
about WaMu's loan underwriting standards were incorporated into registration
statements and prospectuses (collectively "offering documents") for WaMu's MBS
offerings as well as those of other financial institutions that securitized WaMu
mortgages.
1 2
This Article will seek to explain why attorneys continued to assist with MBS
offerings even as originators were increasingly extending loans to borrowers who
did not have the capacity to repay them. Financial institutions were highly
motivated to sell lucrative MBS, which made it difficult for in-house attorneys at
WaMu and other financial institutions to forestall the lax lending practices that
enabled the issuance of more mortgage loans. The role of outside counsel consisted
predominately of preparing boilerplate Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") filings for the issuance of MBS and other securities, which were, in large
part, "a scissors and paste-pot job" 3 of originators' claims about their own lending
practices.
6 Bernhard Grossfeld & Hansjoerg Heppe, The 2008 Bankruptcy of Literacy - A Legal Analysis of
the Subprime Mortgage Fiasco, 15 L. &Bus. REV. AM. 713, 730 (2009) (citing U.S. Census Bureau,
Statistical Abstract of the United States 2009: 729 tbl.1159, available at https://www.census.gov/prod/
2008pubs/09statab/banking.pdf).
7 From 2001 to 2006, the number of no-document loans (i.e. loans obtained without the borrower
submitting any documentation to verify employment or stated assets on his/her loan application) rose
from 28.5% of the subprime mortgages in 2001 to 50.8% in 2006. John C. Coffee, Jr., What Went
Wrong? A Tragedy in Three Acts, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 403, 406 tbl.1 (2009); see also Unterman,
supra note 5, at 84 (arguing that originators accepted loans "indiscriminately").
' See Robert S. Friedman & Eric R. Wilson, The Legal Fallout from the Subprime Crisis, 124
BANKING L.J. 420, 425 (2007) (noting that the bankruptcy of Ownit Mortgage was followed by the
bankruptcy of several other prominent loan originators); Jonathan C. Lipson, Re: Defining
Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1229, 1255 (2012) (noting that "new securitization transactions were
being originated" after 2007).
' See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A COLLAPSE 12 (Comm. Print 2011), available
at htp://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-1 12shrg57323/pdf/CHRG-112shrg57323.pdf
15 Id. at 11-12.
n See id. at 10.
12 See infra Part II.B.1.
13 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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Since financial institutions did not retain attorneys to investigate the
soundness of the mortgage market, attorneys had little incentive to question the
quality of the mortgages they were securitizing.' 4 Federal securities laws do not
allow for private actions for aiding and abetting securities fraud," and lawyers lack
the requisite state of mind to aid and abet securities fraud in actions brought by the
SEC, or under the securities laws of most states, when they fail to inform
themselves about their clients' businesses.' 6 Moreover, financial institutions are
unlikely to sue their attorneys for malpractice for failing to detect violations of the
securities laws,17 and attorneys generally do not owe duties to non-clients.'
Scholars have long debated whether attorneys should act as their clients'
gatekeepers, t9 but these debates presuppose that attorneys will have sufficient
"4 See Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1271-72 (2003) (suggesting lawyers are deterred from investigating client
misconduct by current SEC regulations).
" See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
Professor Koniak has described Central Bank's holding not allowing private actions for aiding and
abetting as a "big win" for the bar. Koniak, supra note 14, at 1268.
16 See generally Marc 1. Steinberg, Lawyer Liability After Sarbanes-Oxley - Has the Landscape
Changed?, 3 WYO. L. REV. 371, 378, 380 (2003) (noting that attorneys must knowingly make material
misstatements to incur liability for aiding and abetting under federal law whereas some states require
only a showing of recklessness). As Professor Steinberg notes, the impact of state securities laws has
been significantly lessened by Congress' enactment of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998 such that state securities law actions are generally preempted with respect to nationally traded
securities. See id. at 381.
17 See Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49
VILL. L. REV. 725, 746 (2004) ("Until and unless a corporation is forced into bankruptcy and a trustee
has been appointed, experience teaches that corporations are unlikely to bring malpractice actions
against their lawyers."). Such suits would also usually be barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto. See
Gen. Car & Truck Leasing Sys., Inc. v. Lane & Waterman, 557 N.W.2d 274, 283 (Iowa 1996);
Whiteheart v. Waller, 681 S.E.2d 419, 422 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). Some courts do not apply the
doctrine where the malpractice suit is brought by a receiver. See Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank, 666 F.3d
955, 967 (5th Cir. 2012); FDIC v. O'Melveny &Myers, 61 F.3d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1995).
'" See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: DUTY OF CARE TO
CERTAIN NONCLIENTS § 51 (2000) (setting out the limited circumstances in which lawyers may owe
duties to non-clients); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (N.Y. 1931) ("[I]f there has been
neither reckless misstatement nor insincere profession of opinion, but only honest blunder, the ensuing
liability for negligence is one that is bounded by the contract, and is to be enforced between the parties
by whom the contract has been made.").
" Gatekeepers are "parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation
from wrongdoers." Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986). The literature on attorney gate-keeping post-Enron is
voluminous. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1197-1200, 1203-1207; William H. Simon, Wrongs of
Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibility for Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1,
30-31, 33-34 (2005); Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeper Rules Work?, 47
B.C. L. REVT. 455, 487-88, 491, 496 (2006). There is also a significant amount of prominent work
regarding attorney gate-keeping prior to Enron. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal
Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 872 (1990); Reinier H. Kraakman,
Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 857 (1984).
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information to function as gatekeepers.2" During the subprime era, attorneys failed
to inform themselves about the transactions that they were facilitating and thus
were in no position to advise their clients to comply with the securities laws. If, as
some scholars have theorized, legal services are transitioning from a bespoke model
to a more commoditized one whereby attorneys are retained to perform only
certain discrete and narrow tasks, 21 attorneys will increasingly be able to facilitate
securities fraud without possessing the requisite knowledge to run afoul of ethical
rules or trigger liability under the securities laws. This problem will persist even if
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-
Frank")2 2 helps to ensure that asset-backed securities ("ABS") are far less risky in
the future.
2 1
To better protect the integrity of the capital markets and ensure that lawyers
do not function as mere scriveners for public securities offerings, this Article will
propose that the SEC impose investigative duties on attorneys akin to those found
in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 3.1 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules").24 The SEC has the statutory
authority pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley to promulgate professional standards for in-
house and outside counsel who appear before it" and should exercise this authority
to ensure that attorneys do not abdicate their duties to exercise "independent
professional judgment" by failing to inform themselves of inconvenient facts when
preparing public offering documents for securities.26
21 See Koniak, supra note 14, at 1280 ("Lawyers don't need to discover what the client is up to; they
know, because they are drifting the scripts, structuring the transactions.").
21 See, e.g., William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461, 479 & n. 94
(2013) (discussing Richard Susskind's theory on the paradigm shift within the legal industry as
presented in his 2008 book The End oflawyers?).
22 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (codified in scattered sections of Title 12, beginning with 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2010)).
23 The SEC has adopted a rule that requires issuers to undertake a review of the underlying assets in
an ABS offering that "must be designed and effected to provide reasonable assurance that the
disclosure . . . regarding the assets is accurate in all material respects." Issuer Review of Assets In
Offerings of Asset-Backed Securities, Securities Act Release No. 9176, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-
9,176 & 34-63,742, 76 Fed. Reg 4231, 4234 (Jan. 25, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229 & 230).
The issuer, however, is able to rely on a third party to undertake this review. Id. at 4235-37.
24 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2013).
25 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 7245 (2002)).
26 Kevin H. Michels, Lawyer Independence: From Ideal to Viable Standard, 61 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 85, 139 (2010) (arguing that lawyer cannot form professional judgment under Model Rule 2.1
unless he or she "gain[s] the information necessary to form a judgment about the matter in question,
which requires inquiry into the facts and circumstances as well as research into the law implicated by the
facts."); see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2013). As this author has observed
previously, however, very few authorities address the meaning of Model Rules of Professional Conduct
R. 2.1. See generally Milan Markovic, Advising Clients After Critical Legal Studies and the Torture
Memos, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 109, 119 (2011) (noting the paucity of authorities and scholarship on Rule
2.1).
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Part I of this Article will briefly explain the nature of the securitization process
and how MBS were created. It will also describe the role of attorneys in this
process. Attorneys for originators, depositors, and underwriters would have
reviewed representations regarding mortgage origination before these
representations were included in MBS offering documents. In theory, the
involvement of attorneys should have ensured that offering documents accurately
reflected originators' lending practices.27 In actuality, lawyers had few incentives to
inquire into lending practices if their clients did not expect them to do so.
Part II will use the example of WaMu to illustrate the disparity between loan
originators' actual lending standards and what was disclosed to investors. WaMu's
in-house lawyers and risk management personnel were largely marginalized as
WaMu loosened its lending standards, and internal concerns about irresponsible
loan origination were not shared with the attorneys who worked on MBS and other
securities offerings on W Vlu's behalf. Indeed, misleading statements about
WaMu's underwriting standards were incorporated not only in offering documents
for WaMu securities, but also those of Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, and other
institutions that securitized mortgage loans from WaMu and its affiliates. Without
a realistic sense of how mortgages were being originated, investors could not
accurately gauge the riskiness of MBS and related investments.
Part III examines the possibility of requiring attorneys involved in the
preparation of public offering documents to conduct a reasonable inquiry to ensure
that the documents do not contain material misrepresentations and omissions. The
SEC is able to impose such a requirement as part of its mandate to regulate
attorneys who appear before it.2" Attorneys who prepare public offering documents
without seeking to corroborate any of the claims therein should be sanctioned and
potentially prohibited from practicing before the SEC.29 This proposal would
increase the likelihood that material misrepresentations are detected and corrected
prior to an offering taking place and would ensure that lawyers take greater
responsibility for the documents that they fde with the SEC.
Attorneys who represented issuers of MBS and related financial products
failed to investigate whether the mortgages they were securitizing were originated
responsibly. This was not an oversight on the part of a small number of attorneys
but a collective abdication to effectuate compliance with the securities laws.
27 This does not mean, of course, that attorneys alone bear responsibility for the content of offering
documents. Underwriters, for example, obtain significant profits from securities offerings and are
expected to "pass on the soundness of the security and the correctness of the registration statement and
prospectus." Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 370 (2d Cit. 1973).
28 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2014).
29 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.6 (2014).
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I. SECURITIZATION AND THE PREPARATION OF
MBS OFFERING DOCUMENTS
A. The Securitization Process
Securitization has been one of the primary means of capital formation in the
United States since the 1990s.3" Virtually any asset that generates cash flow can be
securitized.3 Despite the importance of securitization to the economy, there is little
consensus regarding its definition. For example, Dodd-Frank regulates
securitization 32 without attempting to define it.33
Securitization consists of the transfer of payment rights from income-
producing financial assets to a special-purpose vehicle ("SPV"), which issues
securities to investors.34 The SPV funds itself from the sale of these securities, 35 and
investors are paid from the income generated from the securitized assets.36 Since
the assets (and the income generated therefrom) are separated from the credit risk
of the originator, 37 securitization allows the originator to raise capital more
inexpensively than it otherwise might and permits it to have access to the capital
markets that it might otherwise lack.3"
In the case of MBS, a financial institution, known as a sponsor, assembles
mortgage loans that it or a third party originated. 39 The sponsor then sells the pool
of loans to a subsidiary known as a depositor.4" The depositor proceeds to sell the
loans to an SPV that is usually in the form of a trust.41 The trust sells the
certificates to investors, which entitle the investors to payments from the mortgages
3 See Lipson, supra note 8, at 1231-32.
3 See Unterman, supra note 5, at 79.
32 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1890-98 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2010)) (referencing Subtitle D -
Improvements to the Asset-Backed Securitization Process).
31 See Lipson, supra note 8, at 1232; see also Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset
Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1374 (1991) ("The
difficulty in constructing a satisfactory definition of securitization is that the term is used to describe a
wide variety of financial transactions, from the most basic mortgage-backed security to a complex
offering of multiple layers of debt and equity interests in a single asset or pool of assets.").
3" See Steven L. Schwarcz, Disdosure's Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L.
REV. 1109, 1111 (2008).
" See William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal: From
Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 800 (2013); Schwarcz, supra
note 34.
36 See Lipson, supra note 8, at 1239 (suggesting that in most securitizations, investors will be
afforded payment rights); Schwarcz, supra note 34.
7 See Lipson, supra note 8, at 1239.
38 See id. at 1243-44.
'9 Adam J. Levitin &Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 13 (2011).
4 Id. This step is not strictly necessary for the securitization but is done for accounting reasons. See
id. at 13 & n.34.
41 Id. at 13-14.
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pools that form the trust, while using the proceeds to pay for the mortgage loans.42
Often the SPV will not sell the securities directly but through the depositor and an
underwriting syndicate.43 By the end of 2007, of the approximately $9.7 trillion
held in ABS, $7.2 trillion were held in MBS.44 The vast majority of MBS and
other ABS were publicly issued.4"
Although prominent figures have blamed securitization for the financial
crisis, 46 the securitization of MBS and CDOs, in particular, was largely
responsible.4 7 MBS and CDOs are both backed by mortgage loans.48 However,
whereas MBS entitle the holder to primary payment rights from a pool of
mortgages, CDOs entitle the holder only to partial payments from a pool of assets
that include MBS and other securities as well, such as bonds and derivatives.49
Many of the riskiest MBS were packaged into CDOs.s° Financial institutions also
issued so-called "synthetic CDOs," which essentially represented bets via credit
default swaps on the performance of certain MBS.5 ' After assigning stellar ratings
to MBS and CDOs for years, credit agencies downgraded most of these
investments to junk status by the end of 2008.2
The legal industry profited handsomely from structuring MBS and CDO
42 Id. at 14; see also Schwarcz, supra note 34. The trustee would be responsible for either servicing
the loans or contracting with an entity to service the loans. See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 39, at
15-16.
41 See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 39, at 14.
' Grossfeld & Heppe, supra note 6, at 718.
45 See Sandra L. Thompson, Acting Director, Div. of Supervision and Consumer Prot., Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. (FDIC), Addressing the Subcomm. on Hous. & Transp. and the Subcomm. on
Econ. Pol'y of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs (Sept. 20, 2006), available at
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2006/chairman/spsep 2 OO6 .html. It is nevertheless
the case that more and more ABS were being sold through the private markets. See id. (noting that the
share of U.S. mortgage debt financed through private ABS trusts more than doubled between 2003-
2005, from 8.6% to 17.4% of all U.S. mortgage debt financed through ABS trusts).
46 See Lipson, supra note 8, at 1248-49 (noting criticisms of securitization by former Treasury
Secretaries Timothy Geithner and Henry Paulson, among others).
41 See id. at 1250 tbl.
41 See Schwarcz, supra note 34, at 1111-12.
4 Lipson, supra note 8, at 1251.
50 Unterman, supra note 5, at 91.
" Bratton & Levitin, supra note 35, at 791; see also Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in
Mortgage Securitization, 88 IND. L.J. 213, 262 (2013) ("Rather than purchase MBS and thereby fund
mortgages, synthetic CDOs used credit default swaps to enable investors to make side bets on the
performance of existing MBS or CDOs."). In a credit default swap, a party enters into a contract with a
counterparty and pays the counterparty a periodic fee in exchange for the counterparty agreeing to
purchase assets such as MBS if certain events occur. Kristin N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets:
Regulating Conflicts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 185,209 (2013).
52 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 221-24 (2011),
available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn-media/fcic-reports/fcic-final-report-full.pdf. For
example, Moody's downgraded to junk status seventy-six percent of all MBS it had initially rated as
investment grade in 2006 and eighty-nine percent in 2007. Id. at 222-23. By the end of 2008, Moody's
downgraded more than eighty percent of Aaa CDOs and ninety percent of Baa CDOs to junk status. Id.
at 224.
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transactions.5 3 Attorneys worked with sponsors and depositors to document the
purchase, sale, and service of mortgage loans and prepared offering documents that
would be filed with the SEC and disseminated to investors.5 4 The SPV comes into
existence immediately prior to the time of the offering"5 and is generally not
represented by counsel.5 6
With respect to the issuance of MBS and other asset-backed securities, the
securities laws specifically require the disclosure of certain information regarding
the underlying assets, including the presentation of historical delinquency and loss
data." 7 Much of this information will be obtained from the originator of the
mortgage loans, and to the extent that loans do not conform to the originator's
"' See Lipson, supra note 8, at 1245-46; Michael J. de la Merced, The Legal Profession Feels the
Pain of the Recession, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 26, 2009, 2:02 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/the-legal-profession-feels-the-pain-of-the-recession (noting
that securitization groups were bustling prior to the financial crisis); Ameet Sachdev, Sonnenschein
Nath & Rosenthal Adds 100 Lawyers in New York Office, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 23, 2008),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-12-23/news/0812220510_1-sonnenschein-nath-rosenthal-
thacher-proffitt-wood-investment-banks (suggesting that securitization had been a "home run" for
many law firms prior to the financial crisis).
s" See Ronald S. Borod & Andrew M. Sroka, Securitization Reform Halftime Report, 32
BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP., Apr. 2013, at 3; Brian E. Berger, Recent Development, The
Professional Responsibility of Lawyers and the Financial Cisis, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 3, 6
(2011) ("Issuers of MBS customarily retain securities lawyers to help prepare disclosure documents for
MBS offerings."). Another key function of attorneys was to provide "true sale" opinions that assure
investors that the assets in question had actually been sold to the SPV so that creditors of either the
depositor or sponsor could not reach the assets. See David R. Keyes, Bankruptcy-Remote Special
Purpose Entities: A Case and Trial to Watch, 44 TEX.J. BUS. L. 205, 206 (2012); Lipson, supra note 8,
at 1239-40. The true sale opinion has been described as the "'holy grail' of securitization." Id. at 1240 &
n.39 (citing Peter V. Pantaleo et al., Rethinking the Role ofRecourse in the Sale ofFinancial Assets, 52
BUS. LAW. 159, 161 (1996)). For a discussion of the legal ethics of true sale opinions, see Steven L.
Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 42
(2005) (suggesting that lawyers should have the right to issue legal opinions that facilitate lawful
structured finance transactions). The issuance of true sale opinions proved controversial in connection
with Enron's use of SPVs. See William H. Simon, The Market for Bad Legal Advice: Academic
Professional Responsibility Consulting as an Example, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1555, 1556 (2008) ("Lawyers
from Andrews Kurth and from Vinson & Elkins gave opinions to Enron that various asset transfers
represented 'true sales' or involved a 'true issuance' of securities even though the opinions were either
plainly wrong or plainly irrelevant to the circumstances they addressed.") (internal citations omitted);
Dov Solomon, The Rise ofa Giant: Securitization and the Global Financial Crisis, 49 AM. Bus. L.J.
859, 868 (2012). Most of the litigation arising out of the financial crisis has focused on the adequacy of
disclosures regarding the mortgage loans that were securitized into MBS. See Berger, supra, at 6 (noting
private litigation involving disclosures made with respect to MBS and CDOs). See generally SEC
Enforcement Actions, Addressing Misconduct That Led to or Arose From the Financial Crisis, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml (last updated Sept. 18, 2014) (setting out a complete
list of enforcement actions arising out of the financial crisis and status thereof).
" See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 39, at 13-14; see also Bratton & Levitin, supra note 35, at
787.
s6 See P. Gifford Carter, Note, Originator Exposure to Federal Securities Law Liability When
Structuring Asset Backed Securities Transactions, 20 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 271, 273 (2001).
5' See 17 C.F.R. § 229.1100(b) (2014).
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representations, the originator may be contractually required to replace them.58 By
the time offering documents are made available to investors,' the lawyers for the
originator, the depositor, and the underwriter would have all had the opportunity
to scrutinize the representations therein.
Although few attorneys likely set out to facilitate violations of the securities
laws during the subprime era, attorneys did have strong incentives to avoid
inquiring into originators' lending practices. Indeed, the high demand for MBS
and related investments made it unlikely that attorneys would seek to inquire into,
let alone challenge, lax lending standards.
B. Lawyers as Production Managers or Scriveners?
In a traditional securities offering, the role of issuer's counsel has been equated
to that of a "production manager for the entire disclosure process." 9 Because of the
pro-disclosure regime of the federal securities laws, 60 and the possibility of liability
under securities laws for both the client and attorney, lawyers should seek to ensure
that all material facts are disclosed to prospective investors.6 ' This is consistent with
the Model Rules' requirement that attorneys "exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice"62 even if the advice is "unpalatable to the
58 See Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, 'Pure Information," and the SEC
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1708 (2012); Helen Mason, No One Saw It Coming -
Again Systemic Risk and State Foreclosure Proceedings: Why A National Uniform Foreclosure Law Is
Necessary, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 41, 72 (2012); Simkovic, supra note 51, at 232-33 (noting that
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have been more aggressive than private financial institutions in enforcing
repurchase agreements with loan originators). The SEC now requires issuers to review the assets in an
ABS offering. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.193 (2014). This review should provide reasonable assurance to the
representations about the underlying assets are accurate in all material aspects. Id. While an analysis of
this and other SEC rules promulgated pursuant to Dodd-Frank is beyond the scope of this Article,
MBS offering documents were largely misleading because they omitted information necessary for
investors to understand how mortgage loans were actually being originated. See infra Part II.B.2. By
omitting key information, a disclosure can be technically accurate, while still providing a misleading
account of the assets that are being securitized.
" Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Primary Liability of Securities Lawyers, 50 SMU L. Rev. 383,
388 (1996).
o Affiliated Ute Citizens of UT v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)) (noting that the "fundamental purpose [of
the federal securities laws was] to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor'"). For example, Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act prohibit material misstatements or
omissions in public offering documents. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), (e) (2013) (noting that Section 11
only applies to public offerings); 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2013); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,
571-72 (1995) (holding that Section 12 only implicates public offerings of securities). Plaintiffs are not
required to plead that the defendants acted with scienter in such actions. See In re Morgan Stanley Info.
Fund Sec. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 359 (2d Cit. 2010) (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 382 (1983)) ("Issuers are subject to 'virtually absolute' liability under Section 11, while the
remaining potential defendants under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) may be held liable for mere negligence.").
61 See Warren, supra note 59, at 388.
62 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2013).
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client."63 At times, counsel may even be forced to assume an adversarial posture
with the client if the client is reluctant to disclose information that might
negatively affect the marketability of the securities being offered."
When a particular offering is underwritten, the underwriters' counsel will also
review the offering documents to ensure that the necessary disclosures have been
made.6" Under Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act, underwriters are able to
escape liability for any material misrepresentations and omissions contained in an
issuer's offering document if they are able to demonstrate that they, or their
attorneys, reasonably investigated the claims.66
Attorneys, whether they represent the issuer or underwriter, may nevertheless
avoid functioning as independent "production managers" and ensuring that all
requisite disclosures are made. This is because, as scholars have observed in a wide
variety of contexts, attorneys may assist their clients with actions of dubious legality
by choosing to not pursue information that would indicate that their clients are
engaged in fraud or other misconduct.67
Willful ignorance may not only consist of deliberately ignoring clear signs of a
client's wrongdoing, but also of arguably less blameworthy conduct such as failing
to conduct a sufficient inquiry in order to determine whether the client is engaged
in wrongdoing.68 States have disciplined attorneys for deliberately ignoring dear
signs of wrongdoing in the course of providing legal assistance to their dients; 69 but,
I d. cmt. 1.
"See Warren, supra note 59, at 390; see also Marc I. Steinberg, The Corporate/Securities Attorney
as a "Moving Target" - Client Fraud Dilemmas, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 2 (2006) ("The portrayal of the
attorney as 'gatekeeper' is now a fixture in the attorney responsibility landscape.").
65 See, e.g., Poonam Purl, Taking Stock of Taking Stock 87 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 153 (2001)
("[E]ven if the issuer's counsel is... not performing its gatekeeping role, counsel for the underwriter
will continue to have unaltered incentives to perform its gatekeeping function."); Eric Seitz, Comment,
Underwriter Due Diligence: It's [Not] a W1hole New Bailgame, 61 SMU L. REV. 1633, 1653 (2008)
("[U]nderwriter's counsel assumes the due diligence function of ensuring the veracity and completeness
of all registration material.").
6 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (2013); 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2013); Bradley Butwin et al., The
Securities Act, Underwriters and the Due Diligence Defense, N.Y. LJ., Feb. 15, 2010,
http://www.o3mm.com/files/upload/Due%20Diligence%20Defense.pdf ("Proper due diligence provides
underwriters with a complete defense under §§ 11 and 12 .... ).
67 See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer:
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1472 (1966); David Luban, Contrived
Ignorance, 87 GEO. LJ. 957, 976-77 (1999); Simon, supra note 19, at 34-35 ("Deliberate ignorance
and calculated ambiguity are key themes in major scandals from Watergate to Enron... .The legal
community has historically embraced this path of deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity ....").
Professor Koniak had made this point explicitly with respect to the reporting obligations of SEC
attorneys. Koniak, supra note 14, at 1271 ("Lawyers never 'know' that their client is committing a crime
or fraud, not before a court has ruled conclusively, and sometimes not even then.").
6s See Luban, supra note 67, at 969-70.
65 See In re Dobson, 427 S.E.2d 166, 168 (S.C. 1993); Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l
Responsibility, Informal Op. 91-22 (1991); see also MODEL RULES PROP'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2013)
(suggesting that "actual knowledge" can be "inferred from the circumstances"); CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 696 (1986) ("As a lawyer, one may not avoid the bright light of
a clear fact simply by averting one's eyes or turning one's back."); Roiphe, supra note 4, at 198 ("There is
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the impropriety of failing to conduct enough of a meaningful inquiry to assess a
client's conduct is far less clear.7"
The main reason that attorneys may choose not to inform themselves about
the representations in offering documents is that they are ethically required to
terminate their involvement with an offering if they become aware of material
misrepresentations and omissions that will not be corrected.71 Attorneys may even
be required to take further steps such as reporting misconduct to the issuer's boards
of directors. 72 To avoid potential friction with a corporate client and having to
decide whether to terminate a potentially lucrative representation, attorneys can
simply fail to inquire into their clients' claims.
73
There is little prospect of civil liability for attorneys who fail to inform
themselves of the specifics of an offering. Attorneys generally cannot be held liable
for material misrepresentations and omissions contained in offering documents
under Section 11 of the Securities Act.74 Moreover, the Supreme Court has greatly
restricted the breadth of private securities fraud actions under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act such that private actions can only be brought against secondary
actors such as attorneys in unusual circumstances. 7s The SEC is able to bring aiding
and abetting securities fraud actions against attorneys; 76 but, in these actions, the
SEC would have to demonstrate, at a minimum, that the attorneys knew of their
clients' securities fraud. 77 An attorney who does not inform himself or herself about
the claims made in offering documents is unlikely to have the requisite state of
mind for fraud. 7' Furthermore, state securities laws are inapplicable to class actions
at least some argument that even with the actual knowledge standard, by willfully blinding himself to
important facts, a lawyer violates other substantive rules of professional conduct.").
0 Cf Markovic, supra note 26, at 118-19 (noting that lawyers duties qua advisors are
underexplored and under-enforced).
71 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2013); Warren, supra note 59, at 390.
72 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2013); 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1), (b)(3)
(2014).
71 See Koniak, supra note 14, at 1271-72.
74 Section 11 of the Securities Act prohibits misrepresentations in registration statements and other
offering documents and allows for liability only against a narrow range of actors. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)
(2013). These actors include the issuer, directors thereof, and the underwriter. See id.
71 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 552 U.S. 148, 165-66 (2008)
(holding that private causes of actions for securities fraud are available only against primary violators);
see also Gary M. Bishop, A Framework for Analyzing Attorney Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5, 10 U. N.H. L. REV. 193, 210-11 (2012) (suggesting that post- Stoneridge, attorneys can only be
sued by defrauded investors if they went beyond advising their corporate clients and working on offering
documents by making public statements about the offerings at issue); Marc 1. Steinberg & Chris
Claassen, Attorney Liability Under the State Securities Laws: Landscapes and Minefields, 3 BERKELEY
Bus. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court has consistently circumscribed liability for
attorneys under the securities laws since the 1980s).
76 See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 162-63.
7 "Knowledge may be shown by circumstantial evidence, or by reckless conduct, but the proof must
demonstrate actual awareness of the party's role in the fraudulent scheme." Woodward v. Metro Bank of
Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 96 (5th Cir. 1975).
78 See Schlifke v. SeaFirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 948 (7th Cit. 1989) (quoting Barker ,yv. Henderson,
Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496-97 (7th Cit. 1986)) ("A plaintiffs case against an aider,
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involving nationally traded securities79 and do not generally allow for aiding and
abetting liability when attorneys should have known that the claims in the offering
documents were false.
0
To be sure, attorneys' failure to inquire into the veracity of offering documents
can constitute legal malpractice."1 For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that
"[p]art and parcel of effectively protecting a client, and thus discharging the
attorney's duty of care, is to protect the client from the liability which may flow
from promulgating a false or misleading offering to investors."2
Although malpractice liability is a theoretical possibility, a client is unlikely to
sue its attorneys for failing to detect its securities fraud in the course of preparing
securities offering documents. " Such a suit is also likely to be barred by the
doctrine of in pari delictos4 Courts have dismissed malpractice cases against law
firms in numerous cases on the basis that their clients bore more responsibility for
the fraud."5 Most states recognize this equitable defense even when the action is
brought not by the wrongdoer but by a trustee. 6
Of course, many issuers and underwriters will wish to be appraised of material
misrepresentations and omissions in offering documents. But the higher the
demand for the securities, the more pressure there will likely be on attorneys to
merely facilitate the offerings. As Professor Hill has noted:
Once a new instrument [such as MBS] becomes "vetted" and distribution
networks are established, the speed at which the "assembly line" moves can make
focusing on anything other than the immediate term difficult. All participants in
the distribution, including .. .lawyers . . .have strong incentives to keep the
abetter [sic], or conspirator may not rest on a bare inference that the defendant 'must have had'
knowledge of the facts.").
" See Steinberg, supra note 16, at 381 (noting the effect of the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 on state securities law actions).
80 See id. at 380. A full discussion of aiding and abetting securities fraud under state securities laws
is beyond the scope of this Article. For a useful introduction, see Steinberg, supra note 75, at 5-41.
81 See FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541, 1549-51 (10th Cir. 1992); FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers,
969 F.2d 744, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'don other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
82 OMelveny, 969 F.2d at 749.
83 See Cramton, supra note 17, at 746.
84 "The Latin phrase in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis[,]" means
"[i]n a case of equal or mutual fault ... the position of the [defending] party.... is the better
one." Bateman Eichler, Hills Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985) (citing
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979)). This equitable defense is used to dismiss
suits where the plaintiff bears substantially equal responsibility for his or her injury.
See id. at 307.
85 See Peterson v. Winston & Strawn LLP, 729 F.3d 750, 751-52 (7th Cir. 2013); Gen. Car &
Truck Leasing Sys., Inc. v. Lane & Waterman, 557 N.W.2d 274, 283 (Iowa 1996); Whiteheart v.
Waller, 681 S.E.2d 419, 422-23 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009); Tillman v. Shofner, 90 P.3d 582, 585-87 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2004).
16 See In re Dublin Secs., Inc., 133 F.3d 377, 380-81 (6th Cit. 1997) (applying Ohio law); Hirsch v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1093-94 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying Connecticut law); Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114,119-20 (2d Cit. 1991) (applying New York law).
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assembly line going. They and others on the assembly line are highly paid "cogs in
the wheel." Succeeding at churning out securities requires not questioning the
task or product; stopping the line would risk diminishing one's earnings and
perhaps even losing one's job. 7
The conception of lawyers and legal services as part of an "assembly line" in the
creation of MBS stands in stark contrast to how the profession often conceives of
itself and its work. 8 Nevertheless, this is an accurate description of much of the
legal work that was conducted in connection with the issuance of MBS and CDOs.
The next Part of this Article uses the example of WaMu to illustrate the extent
to which attorneys failed to provide an adequate picture of the mortgages that they
were being paid to securitize.
II. LAWYERS AND WAMU
WaMu was founded in 1889 and issued its first home loan in 1890.' 9 At the
time of its collapse, WaMu was the sixth largest bank in the United States with
over $300 billion in assets, $188 billion in deposits, and over 43,000 employees. 90
Regulators seized the bank on September 25, 2008 after WaMu encountered a
severe liquidity crisis because of a precipitous drop in the value of its mortgage
assets.91 JP Morgan Chase ultimately acquired WaMu for $1.9 billion.92
WaMu's collapse was predominately caused by its lax underwriting of
mortgage loans. 93 It was by no means the only institution that engaged in
irresponsible lending prior to the financial crisis, but the existence of thorough
accounts of its collapse allow for an in-depth analysis of the disconnect between its
87 Claire A. Hill, Why Didn't Subprime Investors Demand a (Much Larger) Lemons Premium?, 74
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47,59 (2011).
88 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2013) ("Almost without exception,
clients come to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and
regulations, deemed to be legal and correct."). The attorney is also described as "a public citizen having
special responsibility for the quality of justice." Id. pmbl. He or she is also one who will reference not
only the law, but "other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be
relevant to the client's situation." Id. R. 2.1.
" See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A COLLAPSE 56 (Comm. Print 2011), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg57323/pdf/CHRG-112shrg57323.pdf; Peter S.
Goodman & Gretchen Morgenson, Saying Yes to Anyone, WaMu Built Empire on Shaky Loans, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, at Al, 22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/business/28wamu.
html.
'o STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET
AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A COLLAPSE 10 (Comm. Print 2011).
91 Id.
92 Id.
9' See id. at 56; Goodman & Morgenson, supra note 89, at 22 ("'It was the Wild West.... [i]f you
were alive, [WaMu] would give you a loan. Actually, I think if you were dead, [WaMu] would still give
you a loan.'") (quoting Steven M. Knobel, the founder of an appraisal company that frequently worked
with WaMu).
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lending practices and what was disclosed to investors. " As the Senate
Subcommittee on Investigations concluded in its report on the financial crisis:
[WaMu's] strategy for growth and profit led to the origination and securitization
of hundreds of billions of dollars in poor quality mortgages that undermined the
U.S. financial system. WaMu had held itself out as a prudent lender, but in
reality, the bank turned increasingly to higher risk loans.... [It] was emblematic
of a host of financial institutions that knowingly originated, sold, and securitized
billions of dollars in high risk, poor quality home loans.... [T]he high risk loans
they issued became the fuel that ignited the financial crisis.
95
Lawyers were unwilling or unable to stop WaMu from issuing, selling, or
securitizing these "high risk, poor quality home loans."
96
Even as WaMu's deteriorating lending standards were being contested within
the Bank, WaMu's MBS offering documents did not convey that it was lending
recklessly. Other financial institutions incorporated WaMu's material
misrepresentations and omissions about its loan underwriting into its own securities
offerings involving WaMu loans. The lawyers involved in all of the securities
offerings may not have intended to further securities fraud, but they also did not
seek to provide investors with a realistic sense of how WaMu mortgages were
originated.
A. WaMu and the Power of Yes
Until the mid-1990s, WaMu had been a mid-sized bank that specialized in
home mortgages. 97 Then, in 1996, WaMu began six years of acquisitions, whereby
it purchased more than a dozen financial institutions, induding American Savings
Bank, Great Western Bank, Fleet Mortgage Corporation, Dime Bancorp, PNC
Mortgage, and Long Beach Mortgage ("Long Beach").98 After these acquisitions, it
became the sixth largest bank in the United States and one of the largest
originators of home loans.
99
WaMu's business model depended on retaining only a small percentage of the
mortgage loans that it originated.100 It either securitized its mortgages to sell to
investors or sold them directly to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 1 ' To enable
WaMu to continue to grow in a time of increasing competition in the home
mortgage industry, WaMu's CEO, Kerry Killinger, aspired to transform home
9' See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A COLLAPSE 66-192 (Comm. Print 2011);
KIRSTEN GRIND, THE LOST BANK (Simon & Schuster 2012); Goodman & Morgenson, supra note 89.
95 STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET
AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A COLLAPSE 66,68 (Comm. Print 2011).
96 Id. at 68.
9' Id. at 66.
" Id. at 76.
9 Id.
" See id. at 66-67.
101 Id.
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lending in much the same way that Wal-Mart had transformed retail sales.'0 2 This
meant making mortgage loans available to middle and lower income Americans
who did not qualify for traditional mortgages. 0 3
WaMu's commitment to this goal was best captured by its popular advertising
campaign dubbed "The Power of Yes.""0 4 Television commercials boasted of
WaMu's "flexible lending rules," "quick approval," and also intimated that WaMu
would approve loans without requiring basic documents such as pay stubs.'
From January 2005 until its collapse, WaMu implemented a "High Risk
Lending Strategy" that focused on originating higher risk loans such as subprime
loans, Option ARMs, and home equity loans as opposed to low-risk, fixed-rate
mortgage loans, in order to claim an even greater share of the mortgage market." 6
These loans were more profitable for WaMu because borrowers generally had to
pay higher interest rates and origination fees, and investors consequently assigned
greater value to them.'0 7 In the period from 2003 to 2006, WaMu's mortgage
originations that were fixed rate loans fell from sixty-four percent to twenty-five
percent, while originations from subprime loans, Option ARMs, or home equity
loans increased from nineteen percent to fifty-five percent.10'
As WaMu was increasing the risk of its mortgage loan portfolio, it was
simultaneously easing its lending rules. One significant change was to originate
more "stated income loans," whereby the Bank would not require proof of a
lender's income." 9 By the end of 2007, stated income loans made up fifty percent
of subprime loans, seventy-three percent of Option ARMs, and ninety percent of
home equity loans issued by WaMu." 0 An increasing percentage of WaMu's
residential mortgage loans were also coming from third-party lenders and
independent brokers."' These loans were approximately sixty-six percent less
102 See Goodman &Morgenson, supra note 89, at Al.
13 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A COLLAPSE 66 (Comm. Print 2011).
104 See GRIND, supra note 94, at 68.
10' Id. At the height of the real estate bubble, WaMu extended a second loan on a home to O.J.
Simpson. Id. at 179.
106 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A COLLAPSE 66, 79 (Comm. Print 2011).
Subprime loans were loans that were issued to borrowers who lacked the credit to qualify for traditional
fix rate mortgages. See id. at 84. Under WaMu's High Risk Lending Strategy, one could qualify for a
home loan with a FICO score of 620. Id. at 83. Option ARMs have an interest rate that is pegged to
prevailing interest rates, but the borrower pays an initial "teaser" rate and is qualified for the loan via the
initial rate. See id. at 85, 133.
107 See id. at 85. WaMu would earn eight times as much from securitizing subprime loans than
fixed rate loans, for example. Id. at 86.
los Id. at 91.
109 See id. at 117-19; GRIND, supra note 94, at 123 (noting that risk management personnel could
not limit the number of stated income loans being issued).
... STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET
AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A COLLAPSE 117 (Comm. Print 2011).
m See id. at 114.
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expensive for WaMu to originate and were subject to minimal oversight from
WaMu.
112
Another significant change came in the form of issuing home loans with high
loan-to-value ("LTV") ratios.1 ' Banking regulators advise banks to avoid LTV
ratios over eighty percent, but a significant percentage of WaMu's home loan
portfolio consisted of loans with a LTV ratio of eighty percent, and the High Risk
Lending Strategy, initiated by WaMu's management and discussed below, called
for loans with LTV ratios of ninety percent." 4 In 2006, WaMu began issuing loans
that would provide financing for 100% of a property's purchase.11 While issuing
more mortgage loans with high LTV ratios, WaMu was also pressuring appraisers
to inflate home values." 6 In November 2007, then New York Attorney General,
Andrew Cuomo, filed suit against WaMu's primary appraiser for appraisal fraud,
which later settled for a substantial amount."'
Outright mortgage loan fraud was also rampant at WaMu. In 2005, WaMu's
General Counsel initiated an internal investigation of two WaMu offices in
Southern California, finding fraud in forty-two percent of loans
reviewed."Examples of the fraud included employees willfully misrepresenting a
borrower's identity, income, and assets.' 9 A broker who led one of these offices
claimed to have made 2,300 mortgages in 2005 - a rate of six mortgages every day,
including weekends and holidays.' ° WaMu not only failed to close the office, but
also rewarded the broker with a lavish trip to Hawaii and other perks.'
WaMu was largely unconcerned with the poor quality of its loan underwriting
because it passed much of the risk onto other financial institutions and investors.
22
This strategy was successful until the crash of the real estate market.'23
Some prominent WaMu insiders opposed its reliance on risky mortgage loans.
At a 2004 corporate retreat, Jim Vanasek, WaMu's Chief Risk Officer, publicly
112 See id. at 114-115.
113 See id. at 119.
114 See id. at 84, 119. In 2005, WaMu actually set up automatic loan approval for Option Arms and
home equity loans with a 90% LTV. Id. at 119. Borrowers with credit scores as low as 620 were eligible.
Id.
I 5 See id. at 120.
116 See GRIND, supra note 94, at 178.
117 See id. 178-79; Press Release, Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Secures $7.8 Million
Settlement with First American Corporation and Eappraiseit for Role in Housing Market Meltdown
(Sept. 28, 2012), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-secures-78-milion-
settlement-first-american-corporation-and.
.s STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET
AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A COLLAPSE 123-24 (Comm. Print 2011).
"1 Id. at 124-25.
120 GRIND, supra note 94, at 144.
121 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OFA COLLAPSE 126-27 (Comm. Print 2011).
122 See id. at 148. WaMu issued $37.2 billion in RMBS securitizations directly to investors in 2004,
$73.8 billion in 2005, and $72.8 billion in 2006. See id.
123 See id. at 66. WaMu, in some cases, securitized the mortgage loans that were most likely to
default or were suspected to be fraudulent. See id. at 148.
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challenged WaMu's management by suggesting that "the power of yes absolutely
needed to be balanced by the wisdom of no." 124 Vanasek also circulated a
memorandum prior to the initiation of the High Risk Lending Strategy that
expressed his concerns regarding the unsustainability of home prices and
encouraged the Bank to adopt tighter underwriting standards. 2 ' Vanasek earned
the moniker "Dr. Doom" for his warnings about WaMu's exposure to the housing
market, but neither WaMu's CEO, nor its Board of Directors, heeded his
concerns.1
26
Another dissenting voice within WaMu was its General Counsel, Fay
Chapman. In 2003, Chapman stopped all securitizations from Long Beach,
WaMu's subprime lending arm, after one of her subordinates reported that Long
Beach was engaging in mortgage fraud and misrepresenting its underwriting
standards.'2 7 Although some WaMu officers opposed the stoppage of Long Beach's
lucrative securitizations, Chapman was able to convince WaMu CEO Killinger
that securitizations should not proceed until Long Beach's lending practices no
longer posed a litigation risk.121
A subsequent three-month investigation led by Chapman revealed that many
mortgage files were missing basic paperwork. 29 Some of the files were so
incomplete that Long Beach would not be able to foreclose in the event of a
default. 130 Chapman and her team ultimately determined that of the 4,000
mortgages reviewed, only 950 could be sold to investors. " Long Beach
securitizations were reinstated in 2004 after Chapman concluded that it no longer
represented a significant liability risk. '32 A few months later, however, Long
Beach's management loosened its underwriting standards to again increase its
output of mortgage loans.'33
124 Id. at 182. The Chief Risk Officer is "directly responsible for the enterprise risk management
system, which tracks some of the major risks that the firm faces" and ensures that the firm avoids
"excessive risk exposures." Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create
Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
219, 250 (2009).
125 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A COLLAPSE 87-88 (Comm. Print 2011).
126 See Id. at 88, 141; see also GRIND, supra note 94, at 123-24 (noting that WaMu never
embraced Vanasek's idea to adopt more stringent lending practices).
127 See GRIND, supra note 94, at 56, 76.
121 See id. at 76.
129 Id. at 76-77.
"I Id. at 77.
131 Id.
132 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A COLLAPSE 100 n.216 (Comm. Print 2011).
133 See id. at 100; GRIND, supra note 94, at 136-37 (noting that the oversight instituted by
Chapman had become "unglued"). Long Beach loans performed so poorly in 2004 and 2005 that it was
obligated to purchase nearly $837 million in loans. See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A
COLLAPSE 102-03 (Comm. Print 2011). Although Long Beach's problems resurfaced after Chapman's
intervention, Chapman fulfilled her ethical obligations in stopping the Long Beach securitizations after
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While it is difficult to know whether WaMu's collapse could have been
avoided, the Bank may have benefitted from greater coordination between its Risk
Management department and General Counsel's office. Vanasek frequently
expressed his concerns about WaMu's lax underwriting to WaMu's board,'34 but
Vanasek was not a lawyer and conceived the threat to WaMu largely in terms of
the underperformance of WaMu's mortgage loan portfolio if housing prices ceased
their upward trajectory.135 Under such circumstances, WaMu's Board of Directors
could have reasonably deferred to the Bank's long-time CEO as to the Bank's
proper business direction. A lawyer in Vanasek's position may have conceived of
the threat differently - namely in terms of litigation risk emanating from selling
and securitizing mortgages that were not originated in accordance with WaMu's
representations and warranties.136
Similarly, Chapman did not appear to be aware that many of the problems she
had observed at Long Beach were characteristic of WaMu as a whole. Indeed, she
had supported WaMu's High Risk Lending Strategy because she erroneously
assumed that Vanasek could keep WaMu from carrying too much risk.137 However,
WaMu had been issuing risky loans prior to the formal adoption of the strategy,13 8
and WaMu had cut the ranks of its Risk Management department significantly. 139
Chapman eventually came to oppose the High Risk Lending Strategy, but, by that
time, Vanasek had been retired for several years, and she lacked allies within upper
management.140
Irrespective of whether WaMu's collapse could have been averted, personnel
inside WaMu had contested its lending practices long before the implosion of the
United States real estate market. There is no record of WaMu's outside counsel
she was informed of its fraudulent lending practices. A lawyer who knows of "a violation of law that
reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization," is generally expected to report the violations to a higher authority in the organization.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2013). In this case, Chapman reported Long Beach's
problematic underwriting to KiUinger, who acquiesced to her demand to stop all Long Beach
securitizations. See GRIND, supra note 94, at 76. Chapman was not obligated to go to WaMu's board of
directors because Killinger took corrective action. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13
cmts. 4-5 (2013).
4 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A COLLAPSE 141-42 (Comm. Print 2011).
... See id. at 87-88; GRIND, supra note 94, at 135.
136 As Professor Bainbridge notes, business risk management and legal risk management differ
because the former is inevitably linked with risk-taking. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and
Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 990 (2009). However, in the words of one WaMu
executive, attorneys tend to "want[] to be open kimono about everything." GRIND, supra note 94, at 179;
see also Langevoort, supra note 4, at 501-02 (discussing the debate regarding whether legal compliance
and business ethics should fall under the auspices of the General Counsel's office).
137 See GRIND, supra note 94, at 123.
138 For example, nearly sixty percent of the loans that WaMu was making were higher-risk loans
before the High Risk Lending Strategy. See id. at 122.
139 See id. at 122-23.
'40 See id. at 149,179-80; Symposium, Corporate Compliance: The Role of Company Counsel, 21
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 491, 528 (2008) (suggesting that having coordination between the General
Counsel's office, risk management, audit, and compliance is more likely to lead to effective gatekeeping).
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having raised similar concerns, and as set out below, offering documents for
WaMu's MBS did not reflect the deterioration of its underwriting standards. This
may be because, as some scholars have suggested, outside counsel generally have
less capacity than in-house counsel to ferret out wrongdoing. 4' However, the
significant disconnect between what was known within the Bank about its lending
practices and what was disclosed to investors strongly suggests that attorneys who
represented WaMu failed to inform themselves about its lending practices.
Attorneys who represented other financial institutions that securitized WaMu
mortgages also appeared to not question that WaMu was a prudent lender.
42
B. The Misrepresentation of WaMu's Underwriting Standards
After WaMu's collapse, investors filed a number of securities class actions
against WaMu, its officers, and its directors for failing to disclose the lax nature of
WaMu's mortgage loan underwriting. Some of these actions concern alleged
material misrepresentations and omissions in WaMu's MBS offering documents,'43
whereas others pertain to alleged material misrepresentations and omissions in
offering documents for other WaMu securities. 144 Separately, plaintiffs have
initiated securities fraud actions against other financial institutions that securitized
WaMu mortgages. This section will examine these actions.
141 See Gilson, supra note 19, at 914-15 ("Reduced costs of changing lawyers made private
gatekeeping an increasingly difficult proposition.... If we want a private gatekeeper, and the market
power necessary for private gatekeeping has moved in-house, then so too must the gatekeeping
function."); Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 462-63 (2008)
("[I]t is no longer the case that outside market gatekeeping firms are the self-evident choice for the
company's gatekeeping function.... [Gatekeepers] may already be embedded within the firm, in the
form of inside counsel, awaiting the opportunity to activate the corporate conscience."). But see Stephen
M. Bainbridge, The Tournament at the Intersection of Business and Legal Ethics, 1 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 909, 920 (2004) ("Even if the legal department's human resources policies do not create a
promotion tournament.., in-house lawyers have strong incentives to stay on the good side of senior
management. Although the general counsel often is formally appointed by the board of directors, his
tenure normally depends mainly on his relationship with the CEO."); Langevoort, supra note 4, at 503-
.05 (suggesting that in-house attorneys with a high appetite for risk may have a competitive advantage
over their risk-averse peers under certain circumstances).
142 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A COLLAPSE 148-49 (Comm. Print 2011)
(demonstrating that other companies continued to constantly buy securities from WaMu).
143 The primary cases were consolidated into In re WaMu Mortgage-Backed Securities Litigation
(hereinafter MBS). See Boilermakers Nat'l Annuity Trust Fund v. WaMu Mortg. Pass Through
Certificates, Nc. C09-0037MJP, 2010 WL 1336959, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 2010).
44 The 'non-MBS cases were consolidated into In re WaMu, Inc., Securities Litigation. See In re
WaiMu, Inc. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 259 F.R.D. 490, at 494 (W.D. Wash. May 15, 2009)
(explaining the procedural history and order to consolidate the securities actions and appointment of
Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board as lead plaintiff).
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1. Litigation against WaMu.-After the crash of the United States real estate
market, MBS investors brought actions under Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities
Act against WaMu for misrepresenting its lending practices.'45 Purchasers of other
WaMu securities also filed suits on similar bases. 146
The main MBS litigation against WaMu was filed in the Western District of
Washington and consolidated as In re Washington Mutual Mortgage-Backed
Securities (MBS) Litigation.147 The class action concerned thirty-six offerings of
MBS that took place between January 26, 2006 and June 26, 2007, with a collective
value of nearly $47.25 billion.141
The two registration statements149 for the offerings at issue in In Re WaMu
MBS Litigation stated that:
In the loan application process, prospective mortgagors generally will be required
to provide information regarding such factors as their assets, liabilities, income,
credit history, employment history and other related items .... With respect to
establishing the prospective mortgagor's ability to make timely payments, the
mortgage loan seller may require evidence regarding the mortgagor's employment
and income.. .."
Whether or not WaMu "generally" required borrowers to provide information
regarding assets and the like, the registration statements failed to set out the reality
of WaMu's mortgage origination. As set out in the previous section, WaMu was
increasingly securitizing loans from independent brokers and other loan originators
and therefore could not be certain what information borrowers were required to
provide.'51 Many of the loans that WaMu itself originated were "stated income
loans," suggesting that WaMu would only rarely require evidence regarding the
141 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2013); 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2013). For a thorough discussion of the
differences between Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2) liability, see Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without
a Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429, 440 (2000).
146 See Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint 1, In re WaMu, Inc. Secs. Litig., 259
F.R.D. 490 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (No. 2:08-md-1919 MJP), 2009 WL 2175220 [hereinafter WaMu Sec.
Litig. Compl].
147 See Boilermakers, 2010 WL 1336959, at *2.
141 See Second Amended Consolidated Complaint 2, 6, Boilermakers Nat'l Annuity Trust Fund
v. WaMu Mortg. Pass Through Certificates, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 28, 2010) (No.
C09-0037 MJP), 2010 WL 1485011 [hereinafter WaMu MBS Second Compl.]. A total of 75,608
mortgage loans had been originated and securitized by WaMu in connection with these offerings. See id.
6.
149 All of the offerings implicated in the litigation were based on two registration statements filed by
WaMu. See id. 1. Registration statements that are filed in anticipation of future offerings are known
as shelf registration statements and are effective for up to three years. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(5)
(2014).
' WaMu MBS Second Compl., supra note 148, 138 (quoting Washington Mutual Asset
Acceptance Corp. ("WMAAC"), Registration Statement (Form S-3/A) (Jan. 3, 2006); WMAAC,
Registration Statement (Form S-3/A) (Apr. 9, 2007)).
' See id. 139(b), (c); see also supra Part II.A.
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mortgagor's employment and income. 152 WaMu even waived documentation
requirements for borrowers with poor credit.
153
The plaintiffs also identified material misrepresentations and omissions in the
prospectuses for WaMu's MBS offerings. The prospectuses claimed that WaMu's
underwriting guidelines "generally are intended to evaluate the prospective
borrower's credit standing and repayment ability and the value and adequacy of the
mortgaged property as collateral." 154 These claims about WaMu's general
underwriting guidelines were also misleading because WaMu was issuing loans on
the basis of little-to-no documentation and was unconcerned with repayment
ability, since WaMu originated mortgages to sell to other financial institutions and
investors.'55 In terms of the "adequacy of mortgaged property as collateral," WaMu
was issuing loans with higher-than recommended LTV ratios while pressuring
appraisers to inflate home values.'
56
The district court judge dismissed the claims in In Re WaMu MBS Litigation
with respect to twenty-five of the offerings because the named plaintiffs lacked
standing." 7 The remaining claims survived WaMu's motion to dismiss, with the
judge finding that the plaintiffs had stated a claim with respect to WaMu's alleged
misrepresentation of its underwriting guidelines.' The parties settled the case for
$26 million.'59
A more recent MBS action was initiated by MBS investors in 2012 in the
Southern District of Ohio.16' Although the Sections 11 and 12 claims concern
different MBS offerings from In Re WaMu MBS Litigation, the investors
1s2 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A COLLAPSE 117-18 (Comm. Print 2011);
WaMu MBS Second Compl., supra note 148. 141(a); GRIND, supra note 94, at 123.
151 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A COLLAPSE 117-18 (Comm. Print 2011). This
is in direct conflict with another claim in the registration statements that only borrowers who met
certain eligibility criteria would be able to receive loans without providing documentation. See WaMu
MBS Second Compl., supra note 148, 4 140 (referencing Washington Mutual Asset Acceptance Corp.
("WMAAC"), Registration Statement (Form S-3/A) (Jan. 3, 2006); WMVAAC, Registration Statement
(Form S-3/A) (Apr. 9, 2007)).
"' WaMu MBS Second Compl., supra note 148, 143 (quoting WAMU Series 2007-HY5 (Form
424B5 Supplement) (Apr. 23, 2007)). Eighteen additional offerings contained this exact language. See
id. (noting the location of the representation in Prospectus Supplements for nineteen offerings).
1S5 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A COLLAPSE 148 (Comm. Print 2011).
156 See WaMu MBS Second Compl., supra note 148, 146, 147(b); see also supra Part II.A.
"' See Boilermakers Nat'l Annuity Trust Fund v. WaMu Mortg. Pass Through Certificates, 748 F.
Supp. 2d 1246, 1253 (W.D. Wash. 2010).
1"' See id. at 1255.
1.9 See Drew DeSilver, $26 Million Settlement Reached in WaMu Mortgage Securities Suit,
SEATFLE TIMES (Sept. 5, 2012, 12:38 PM), http://seattletimes.com/htmllbusinesstechnology/201 9 07 2
674_waMusettlementxml.html.
160 See Second Amended Complaint 4 6-7, W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., No. 1:11-CV-00495 (S.D. Ohio June 22, 2011), 2012 WL 1710219 [hereinafter Ohio MBS
Compl.].
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identified many of the same types of material misrepresentations and omissions in
WaMu's offering documents. The prospectus supplements for these offerings
suggested that WaMu would rarely process loans without full documentation,161
when WaMu was in fact regularly waiving documentation requirements.162 The
complaint also alleges that WaMu was notified by a due diligence firm that fifty-
four percent of its loans did not meet their underwriting guidelines, but that
WaMu nevertheless securitized the loans without informing investors. 163
Investors in other WaMu securities have also sued WaMu with respect to its
lax underwriting of mortgage loans. In In Re WaMu Securities Litigation,
investors in WaMu notes filed class actions against WaMu, its directors,
underwriters, and accounting firm for violations of Sections 11 and 12 of the
Securities Act as well as violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. 64 The
complaint alleges inter alia, that WaMu misrepresented the value of its mortgage
loan portfolio by not disclosing its lax lending practices 165 and by pressuring
appraisers to inflate home values.' 66
The offering documents for the notes stated that "[WaMu] seeks to mitigate
the credit risk in this portfolio by ensuring compliance with underwriting standards
on loans originated to subprime borrowers" and "actively manages the credit risk
inherent in its Option ARM portfolio primarily by ensuring compliance with its
underwriting standards."1 67 As noted, WaMu was likely not in a position to ensure
"compliance with its underwriting standards" because many loans were initiated by
third parties and even risky borrowers were able to receive loans without having to
submit the required documentation.'68 WaMu was also not actively managing its
credit risk because it was issuing loans with higher-than-recommended LTV
ratios.' 69 In Re WaMu Securities Litigation ultimately settled for $208.5 million
dollars.170
That WaMu would wish to avoid disclosing its problematic loan origination
practices in its offering documents for MBS and other securities is unsurprising.
161 See id. 4 72-77 (citations omitted).
162 See id. 78; supra Part II.A.
163 See Ohio MBS Compl., supra note 160, IT 81-84. The SEC has recently amended its
regulations to require that the results of such reviews be disclosed. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.1111(7)(ii)
(2014).
164 WaMu Sec. Litig. Compl., supra note 146, 8-9.
165 See id. 769, 793.
166 See id. 772.
167 See id. 774.
161 See id. 169-74 (discussing the loosening of standards and use of exceptions to increase loan
volume); see also supra Part ]I.A.
169 See supra Part II.A.
17o See Lead Plaintiffs Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlements at 1, In re WaMu,
Inc. Secs. & ERISA Litig., 259 F.R.D. 490 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (No. 2:08-md-1919 MJP), 2011 WL
2582964 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2011). WaMu was responsible for $105 million, the underwriters for
$85 million, and WaMu's accountant for $18.5 million. See id.; see also Order Approving Plan of
Allocation of Net Settlement Funds at 2-3, In re WaMu, Inc. Secs. Lirig., 259 F.R.D. 490 (W.D.
Wash. 2009) (No. 2:08-md-1919 MJP) (W.D. Wash. Nov. 4, 2011) (accepting parties' settlement).
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Public companies are often reluctant to acknowledge issues that might affect the
marketability of their securities, 7 ' and WaMu was highly motivated to dispose of
much of its mortgage portfolio.'72 Yet WaMu did not work on these offerings
alone. Prominent law firms represented the depositors and underwriters in the
various WaMu offerings and permitted these offerings to proceed.
Orrick, Herrick, & Sutcliffe LLP ("Orrick") represented the WaMu-affiliated
depositor ("WaMu depositor") and WaMu-affiliated underwriter ('VaMu
underwriter") in many of the offerings at issue in In re WaMu MBS Litigation.'73
Orrick also represented the WaMu depositor in all of the offerings challenged in
the Ohio MBS litigation,'74 while McKee Nelson LLP ("McKee") represented the
WaMu underwriter in three of these offerings. 5 The law firms of Heller Ehrman
LLP and Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP represented WaMu and the
third-party underwriters in the August and September note offerings at issue in In
re WaMu Securities Litigation.'76
WaMu's shoddy lending eventually became a problem for other banks as well.
Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse, Citigroup, and many other financial institutions
had acquired WaMu loans to securitize and sell to investors, and they all had
incorporated WaMu's misleading representations' 77 regarding its underwriting and
loan origination practices into their own MBS offering documents. The lawyers
who worked on these offerings, much like those who worked on WaMu's offerings,
171 See Warren, supra note 59, at 396-97.
172 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A COLLAPSE 67,148 (Comm. Print 2011).
171 Orrick represented the WaMu depositor in all of the following offerings that were part of the In
re WaMu MBS Litigation: WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., WMALT Series 2007-HY1 (Form 424B5
Supplement) 136 (Jan. 26, 2007); WMALT Series 2006-AR17 (Form 424B5 Supp.) 136 (Nov. 17,
2006); WMALT Series 2006-AR16 (Form 424B5 Supp.) 136 (Nov. 16, 2006); WMALT Series 2006-
AR12 (Form 424B5 Supp.) 140 (Oct. 27, 2006); WMALT Series 2006-AR7 (Form 424B5 Supp.) 140
(Aug. 25, 2006). Offerings in which Orrick represented the WaMu underwriter as well include:
WMALT Series 2007-HY1 (Form 424B5 Supp.) S-88 (Jan. 26, 2007); WVMALT Series 2006-AR17
(Form 424B5 Supp.) S-114 (Nov. 17, 2006).
174 See WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., WMALT Series 2007-0A3 (Form 424B5 Supplement) S-
203 (Mar. 27, 2007); WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., WMALT Series 2006-9 (Form 424B5
Supplement) 140 (Oct. 27, 2006); WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., WMALT Series 2006-5 (Form
424B5 Supplement) 140 (June 29, 2006); WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., WMALT Series 2006-4
(Form 424B5 Supplement) 140 (Apr. 27, 2006); WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., WMALT Series
2005-9 (Form 424B5 Supplement) 86 (Oct. 26, 2005); WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., WMALT
Series 2005-7 (Form 424B5 Supplement) 86 (Aug. 25, 2005).
175 WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., WMALT Series 2006-5 (Form 424B5 Supplement) S-133
(June 29, 2006); WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., WMALT Series 2005-9 (Form 424B5 Supplement)
87 (Oct. 26, 2005); WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., WMALT Series 2005-7 (Form 424B5
Supplement) S-78 (Aug. 25, 2005).
176 See WMI Holdings Corp., (Form 424B5 Supplement) S-33, (Sept. 13, 2006); WMI Holdings
Corp., (Form 424B5 Supplement) S-15 (Aug. 23, 2006). The lead underwriters for these two offerings
were Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Lehman Brothers. WMI Holdings Corp., (Form 424B5 Supplement)
S-30, (Sept. 13, 2006). Note that WMI Holdings Corp. is the new name of WaMu.
177 Id.
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did not ascertain whether WaMu was originating mortgage loans in a responsible
manner and failed to provide investors with a realistic sense of these loans' quality.
2. Actions Against Other Financial Institutions.-Many financial institutions
purchased mortgage loans from WaMu and other loan originators that they would
securitize and sell to investors. These institutions' MBS offering documeqts would
include representations concerning the originators' purported lending practices.
When MBS lost value, investors sued the financial institutions that sponsored
these offerings for misrepresenting the originators' lending standards. This section
will highlight three representative actions involving WaMu mortgages.
178
In NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co., MBS
investors sued Goldman Sachs for misrepresenting the loan underwriting of several
originators, including Countrywide, Greenpoint, Wells Fargo, and WaMu.'
Goldman's offering documents claimed, for example, that WaMu originated
mortgage loans by "evaluat[ing] the prospective borrower's credit standing and
repayment ability and the value and adequacy of the mortgaged property as
collateral." i"' However, the complaint alleges that Goldman's offering documents
failed to disclose that, inter alia, WaMu applied pressure on appraisers and
provided them with pre-determined home values so that it could originate more
home loans.' McKee represented Goldman in the MBS offering backed by
WaMu mortgages."'
Similarly, in AllState Insurance Co. v. CitiMortgage, Inc., MBS investors
brought an action against Citigroup and certain affiliates under Sections 11 and 12
of the Securities Act for misrepresenting the underwriting process used by WaMu
and other loan originators.183 The claims with respect to WaMu mortgage loans
focused on WaMu's alleged practice of extending loans to borrowers who were not
17' See also Berger, supra note 54, at 6 (noting private litigation involving originators' underwriting
standards).
179 See Fourth Amended Complaint, 31-46, 129, NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 743 F. Supp. 2d 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) vacated 693 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2012)
(No. 1:08-cv-10783-MGC), 2012 VL 7655925 [hereinafter Goldman MBS Compl.].
"' Compare GSR Mortg. Loan Trust, 2007-3F (Form 424B5 Supplement) S-51 (Apr. 25, 2007)
[hereinafter GSR 2007-3F Supp.], with WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., Series 2007-HY5 (Form
424B5 Supplement) S-28 (Apr. 23, 2007).
181 See Goldman MBS Compl., supra note 179, 129.
182 GSR 2007-3F Supp., supra note 180, at S-134. As noted in Part II.B.1., the WaMu underwriter
was also a McKee client. Although this may not have constituted a conflict because the interests of
Goldman and the WaMu underwriter were not necessarily in conflict, any concerns raised by McKee to
Goldman regarding WaMu's lending likely would have led it to lose the WaMu underwriter business.
Consequently, the representation of Goldman may have been "materially limited" by the representation
of the WaMu underwriter, and McKee should have sought the consent of both the WaMu underwriter
and Goldman to proceed with the representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7
(2013).
183 See Complaint 2, 305-27, Allstate Ins. Co. v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 650432/2011 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Feb. 17, 2011), 2011 WL 6739013.
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capable of making the required loan payments."l 4 Citigroup's offering documents
did not include information specific to WaMu but represented that "[t]he
originators' underwriting standards were applied to evaluate the prospective
borrower's credit standing and repayment ability and the value and adequacy of the
mortgaged property as collateral." ' Citigroup also claimed that "[a]ll mortgage
loans will have been subject to underwriting standards acceptable to the
depositor.""8 6 Thatcher Proffitt & Wood LLP represented Citigroup in the WaMu
offering.'" 7
Lastly, in Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Credit Suisse Securities
(USA), LLC, MBS investors sued Credit Suisse for fraud and other violations of
New Jersey law for misrepresenting the underwriting standards of WaMu and
other originators.' The complaint alleges that WaMu "pervasively violated its
stated underwriting and appraisal standards" and that due diligence providers found
that "significant percentages of loans WaMu originated did not adhere to
underwriting guidelines."' 89 The prospectus for the offering did not contain any
originator-specific information but claimed that WaMu and other originators
evaluated both "[whether] mortgagor's monthly income . . . will be sufficient to
enable the mortgagor to meet its monthly obligations on the mortgage loan and
other expenses" and "[t]he adequacy of the mortgaged property as security for
repayment of the related mortgage loan." 90 Orrick represented both the Credit
Suisse depositor and underwriter in the MBS offering involving WaMu
mortgages.' 9'
The attorneys who represented Goldman, Citigroup, and Credit Suisse in the
above offerings were certainly aware that mortgage originators' lax underwriting
could expose their clients to liability. The offering documents for these securities
indicated that originators did not use underwriting standards that were as stringent
as those used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. '92 Originators were also
contractually obligated to repurchase loans that did not conform to the
184 See id. 178.
... Citigroup Mortg. Loan Trust Inc., Series 2006-4 (Form 424B5 Supplement) 70 (May 30, 2006).
186 Id. at 195.
117 Id. at 255. Thacher is now defunct, largely because of its heavy focus on securitization. See
generally David Bario, A Really Bad Bet, AM. LAW., Mar. 1, 2009. By 2007, 70% of its revenue came
from structured finance and related work. Id.
18 See Complaint 1, 264, 585-674, Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Credit Suisse Secs. (USA),
LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142191, 2013 WL 5467093 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2013) (No. 2:12CV07242),
2012 WL 6148835.
.89 Id. 264-65. The complaint quotes one employee of a due diligence firm as referring to
WaMu loans as "a joke." Id. 461.
0 Credit Suisse First Bos. Mortg. Secs. Corp., Series 2005-1 (Form 424B5 Supplement) S-37 to
S-38 (Jan. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Credit Suisse 2005-1 Supp.].
"' Id. at S-106. Orrick was heavily involved in WaMu's own offerings of MBS. See supra Part
II.B.1. Therefore, for reasons set out in note 182, would have almost certainly had a conflict of interest
and should have sought the consent of both WaMu and Goldman to proceed with the representation.
192 See GSR Mortg. Loan Trust, Series 2007-3F (Form 424B5 Supplement) 11 (Feb. 13, 2007)
[hereinafter GSR 2007-3F Supp.]; Credit Suisse 2005-1 Supp., supra note 190, at S-17.
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representations and warranties made to the depositor.' 93 But, notwithstanding the
inclusion of cautionary language in the offering documents and the theoretical
availability of recourse against WaMu and other loan originators, none of the
aforementioned financial institutions apprised investors of the degree to which
WaMu and other institutions were deviating from responsible lending practices. 9 4
Indeed, some offerings did not even provide investors with any originator-specific
information.
The attorneys who worked on offerings involving WaMu loans may not have
known that WaMu, or any other originator, was engaging in irresponsible lending.
They may also have believed that qualifying language in the offering documents
and the repurchase provisions would protect their clients from liability for
securitizing poor quality mortgages. Without actually investigating the lending
practices of WaMu and other loan originators, however, they could not
meaningfully gauge whether additional disclosures were necessary or whether these
originators would be able to honor their potentially significant repurchase
obligations. Even if the attorneys were providing the type of representation desired
by their clients, they did not possess enough information to fiulfil their obligations
qua advisors to "exercise independent professional judgment and render candid
advice" with respect to these MBS offerings. 195
Poor quality loans issued by WaMu and other originators were subjected to
minimal scrutiny by lawyers as they were bought, sold, and securitized into MBS.
As a result, originators' irresponsible lending exposed numerous financial
institutions to liability and ultimately jeopardized the entire financial system. The
next Part of this Article will explore whether the SEC should expressly require
attorneys to conduct an inquiry of the claims made in the offering documents that
they help to prepare.
III. SECURITIES OFFERINGS AND THE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE
Scholars have long argued that outside counsel are not ideally positioned to
detect and act on client misconduct.' 96 There are both economic and psychological
explanations for this phenomenon:
193 See GSR 2007-3F Supp., supra note 192, at 33; Credit Suisse 2005-1 Supp., supra note 190, at
S-30 to S-31.
194 The repurchase provisions have provided minimal protection to MBS issuers because many
originators filed for bankruptcy. See Tom Fitzpatrick, Complexity, Complicity, and Liability Up the
Securitization Food Chain, THE CONGLOMERATE BLOG (Jan. 16, 2012),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2012/01/complexity-complicity-and-liability-up-the-securitizatoin-
food-chain.html ("Originator repurchase obligations are only effective if the originator is still around to
repurchase the loans, which has been the case less and less frequently through the crisis."); see also Kurt
Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Secuntization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV.
1257, 1310 (2009) (noting that New Century Financial filed bankruptcy after financial institutions
demanded that it repurchase $9 billion in mortgage loans).
19s MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2013); see also Michels, supra note 26, at 138-39.
196 See Gilson, supra note 19, at 914-15; Kim, supra note 141, at 462-63.
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In the first place, all partners have an incentive to keep key clients happy.... In
the second place . . . [i]n recent years, law firms have shifted away from the old
rules of partnership .... [T]he eat-what-you-kill phenomenon makes it highly
unlikely that ... partner[s] will risk antagonizing key clients absent the proverbial
smoking gun . . . . In the third place, behavioral economic analysis suggests
certain basic cognitive biases likely to discourage lawyers from detecting or acting
upon management misconduct .... [T]hese systematic decision-making biases
generate a type of "cognitive conservatism" that makes a lawyer "likely to dismiss
as unimportant or aberrational the first few negative bits of information that she
receives regarding a client or situation."
19
7
Inside counsel may also be subject to some of the same pressures and biases because,
to advance within an organization, lawyers will often need to possess a high
tolerance for risk.
198
If lawyers had insisted upon investigating originators' lending practices in
order to prepare the offering documents for MBS and related securities, they risked
being replaced by firms that were more willing to sustain the MBS assembly line.1 99
Corporate clients are not dependent on any one law firm to assist with a particular
securities offering.
2 00
Assuming attorneys had investigated the lending standards of WaMu and
other originators, however, they would have been able to ascertain relatively easily
that originators were extending mortgage loans to individuals who. could not meet
their repayment obligations. Reviews of WaMu's internal files or interviews with
risk management and legal personnel would have uncovered serious defects in
WaMu's origination at several key offices.2 1 Conversations with General Counsel
would have indicated that origination at Long Beach, WaMu's subprime lending
arm, had become so problematic that WaMu's General Counsel imposed a
moratorium on securitizations in 2003.202
Attorneys who represented financial institutions in the securitization of loans
from WaMu and other originators may not have had access to internal files and
personnel. Nevertheless, the media reported extensively on the general
deterioration in lending standards of loan originators during the real estate
1917 Bainbridge, supra note 141, at 920-22 (citations omitted).
'9 See Langevoort, supra note 4, at 503-05.
9 See Hill, supra note 87, at 59.
255 See Gilson, supra note 19, at 902; William D. Henderson, Three Generations of U.S. Lawyers:
Generasts, Specialsts, Project Managers, 70 MD. L. REV. 373, 380-81 (2011) (suggesting that the
oversupply of sophisticated business lawyers has increased the purchasing power of large corporate
clients). Inside counsel cannot be replaced as readily, but, as with WaMu, in-house counsel might be
reluctant to challenge the judgments of managers with whom they need to sustain strong relationships.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina J. Johnson, Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and Sarbanes-Oxley
Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299, 324-26 (2004).
201 See supra Part II.A.
202 See supra Part II.A.
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bubble. °3 Consequently, attorneys for Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse, Citigroul ,
and other financial institutions should have sought reassurance that WaMu's
lending practices were sound by, for example, reviewing a random sampling of
WaMu's mortgage files. Although, financial institutions did sometimes conduct
reviews of mortgages prior to purchasing and securitizing them, these reviews were
not carried out by lawyers, but by so-called "due diligence firms" that employed
poorly trained non-lawyers.2 °4 On the rare occasions that due diligence firms raised
concerns about the quality of the mortgages, business personnel would overrule
them so the MBS offerings could proceed. °5
This Part will argue that attorneys must play a greater role in verifying claims
in public offering documents for securities. Specifically, attorneys who work on
securities offerings should be required to form a good faith belief, after a reasonable
inquiry, that the offering documents they helped to prepare for filing with the SEC
do not contain material misrepresentations and omissions. °6 The next Section will
address why this duty, that is usually associated with claims made in litigation,
should also apply to attorneys who practice before the SEC.
A. The Need for a Duty to Investigate
As this Article has sought to demonstrate, attorneys involved in the
preparation of MBS offering documents for WaMu and other financial institutions
failed to inform themselves about the underlying soundness of the mortgages they
were securitizing. In so doing, they contributed to the excesses of the subprime era
and facilitated securities fraud.
In certain representations it may be entirely ethical for attorneys to fail to
inform themselves about significant aspects of their clients' businesses. Not every
matter requires an extensive factual inquiry, and the client may be reluctant to pay
the attorney to conduct such an inquiry.20 7 Indeed, lawyers are generally under no
203 See e.g., Vikas Bajaj, Mortgages Grow Riskier, and Investors Are Attracted, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
6, 2006, at Cl; Jennifer Bjorhus, Foreclosure: The Buck Stops Where? - The U.S. Mortgage Industry
Allows Many Actors Down the Mortgage Chain to Off-Load Much of the Risk of Defaults and
Foreclosures, Insulating Them from Damage - So Far, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 22, 2006, at
Dl; Kathleen Pender, Mortgage Options Explode, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 13, 2006, at C1 (noting that
WaMu claimed to be tightening underwriting standards with respect to Option ARMs because of high
delinquencies in Bay Area).
2o4 See ROBERT W. KOLB, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF OUR TIME 209-211 (2011). Professor
Kolb notes that "[i]n a typical assignment, the due diligence firm reviewed 5-20 percent of the loans
being purchased, with the supervisor for the due diligence firm urging speedy reviews and the on-site
representative of the purchaser urging approvals." Id. at 210. The reviews became even more cursory as
demand for MBS increased. See id.
205 See id.
206 Compare FED. R. Clv. P. 11 (b), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2013).
207 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 5 (2013); see also Schwarcz, supra note
54, at 34 ("[Structured finance] counsel cannot feasibly investigate for fraud in the way that a district
attorney would investigate. That investigation-normally performed by litigators-would be time
consuming and expensive, and no client would pay for its cost.").
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obligation to "initiate investigation of a client's affairs or to give advice that the
client has indicated is unwanted."2"' As Professor Luban has argued, forcing
attorneys to investigate their clients against their clients' wishes may also sever the
attorney-client relationship by creating distrust and stifling open communication. 20 9
A requirement to investigate one's clients would not only be costly and harmful
to the attorney-client relationship, but would also be redundant in many
representations. Attorneys will usually seek to obtain all of the material facts
relevant to the representation because clients normally wish to have an informed
understanding of their actions' legal consequences. 210 Even in representations where
clients do not wish to have this understanding, attorneys may be impaired in their
ability to provide competent and diligent representation without investigating their
clients' claims.211 Moreover, any information not obtained by counsel may possibly
be obtained by the opposing party.
Although attorneys can generally be expected to investigate their clients' claims,
it is not necessarily incompetent for an attorney to fail to do so. Ethical rules afford
attorneys and clients wide discretion to structure representations as they see fit.2" 2
The large financial institutions that issued MBS presumably understood the
implications of incorporating questionable representations from loan originators
into MBS offering documents. They also would have been able to consult with
their in-house counsel about the risks of securitizing poor quality mortgages. It is
not self-evident that ethical rules should compel attorneys to investigate what
sophisticated clients advised by in-house counsel do not believe needs
investigating.213
208 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 5 (2013).
209 See Julie Andersen Hill, Divide and Conquer: SEC Discipline of Litigation Attorneys, 22 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 373, 377-78 (2009) (suggesting that the SEC should refrain from investigating
litigators who represent issuers before the SEC so as to not interfere with issuers' entitlement to a
diligent defense); Luban, supra note 67, at 977.
211 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2013).
211 See id. R. 1.1 cmt. 5 ("Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and
analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem .... [M]ajor litigation and complex
transactions ordinarily require more extensive treatment than matters of lesser complexity and
consequence."); Freedman, supra note 67, at 1478-79 (describing the ability for an attorney to provide
competent representation if not fully informed of the client's situation); Michels, supra note 26, at 116
("[W]hen the attorney provides advice, it must be grounded on sufficient information if it is to be
professional.") (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
212 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2013) ("A lawyer may limit the scope of
the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed
consent.").
213 The Model Rules are paternalistic insofar as they do not permit clients to waive their entitlement
to competent representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1) (2013). As
Professor Michels has suggested, however, such prohibitions are intended to protect the client's ability
to achieve his or her ends, not to interfere with the client's objectives. See Kevin H. Michels, Mhat
Conflicts Can be Waived? A Unified Understanding of Competence and Consent, 65 RUTGERS L.
REV. 109, 135 (2012). Indeed, interfering with a client's ends is "far afield from the client autonomy
that grounds our understanding of legal ethics." Id.; see also ROBERT J. HAFT ET AL., LIABILITY OF
ATTORNEYS AND ACCOUNTANTS FOR SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS § 5:19 (2014) ("Counsel should
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The ethics of maintaining ignorance should not be assessed solely through the
prism of client interests, however. Attorneys' duties are not limited to assisting
clients achieve their ends.214 As advisors, lawyers cannot merely tell their clients
what they wish to hear but must "exercise independent professional judgment and
render candid advice." ' Ethics rules prohibit attorneys from asserting claims in
litigation unless there is a "basis in law and fact for doing so."216 State law and the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers recognize that lawyers can even owe
fiduciary duties to non-clients in limited circumstances, such as when the client
invites a non-client to rely on the lawyer's services.
217
The SEC has broad discretion to regulate the professional conduct of attorneys
that appear before it.21 Attorneys - both in-house and outside counsel - who assist
an issuer with the preparation of offering documents or opine on information that
should be included therein are subject to the SEC's standards of conduct.219
Attorneys who violate the standards may be held in contempt and barred from
practicing before SEC.220 The SEC standards do not specifically obligate attorneys
to inquire into the content of offering documents, 221 but several considerations
unique to securities practice suggest that the SEC should impose heightened
investigative duties on attorneys who practice before it.
First, although it is the issuer who bears the costs of preparing the offering
documents, offering documents are ultimately for the intended benefit of non-
client investors. 222 By ensuring the inclusion of all material facts in the offering
be able to efficiently (from the client's standpoint) define the scope of the retention and, absent a
specific request from the client as to particular items, not be under a duty to investigate the accuracy of
the statements contained in the offering documents.").
214 See Fred Zicharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1389, 1395 (2004)
("[E]veryone will agree that lawyers are clients' agents and that lawyers' traditional role in the adversary
system is to help clients pursue lawful goals ... . That, however, is quite different from saying that
lawyers should do whatever clients want.. ").
"' MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2013).
216 1d. R. 3.1.
217 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: DUTY OF CARE TO
CERTAIN NONCLIENTS § 51(2) (2000); Kevin H. Michels, Third-party Negligence Claims Against
Counsel. A Proposed Unified Liability Standard, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 143, 150-59 (2009)
(setting out various approaches to answer the question of whether lawyers owe duties to third parties).
211 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2014); THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION § 16.4[1] (2014) (noting that the SEC has adopted a "broad definition of
what constitutes practice before [it]"). As Professor Koniak has observed, the SEC has been reluctant to
utilize its full authority vis A vis the organized bar. See Koniak, supra note 14, at 1256-60, 1270-78.
219 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(1)(iii), (iv) (2014).
20 See id. § 205.6(b); HAZEN, supra note 218, § 16.4[3] (noting that the SEC can "suspend or bar
professionals from practicing before the Commission if they engage in improper professional conduct")
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The AttorneyAs Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1293, 1310 (2003).
222 See Warren, supra note 59, at 387; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS: DUTY OF CARE TO CERTAIN NONCLIENTS § 51(3) (2000) (suggesting that a lawyer owes
a duty to a non-client when the client intends that the lawyer's services will benefit a non-client, the
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documents, attorneys protect their clients while facilitating the ability of investors
to make informed investing decisions.223 If attorneys do not seek to verify or
corroborate any of the claims contained in their clients' offering documents, they
cannot "exercise independent professional judgment" and provide an independent
assessment of what should be disclosed to investors.224 While clients and attorneys
should be afforded some flexibility in structuring their representations, the public
interest in safeguarding issuers' ability to obtain assistance with securities offerings,
without the issuer and its attorneys engaging in a meaningfiil dialogue as to what
disclosures should be included in the offering documents, is minimal.2 25
Second, unlike litigation and most transactional matters, there is no adversary
or counterparty to contest misrepresentations in the offering documents. 226
Although some investors may be sophisticated enough to conduct extensive due
diligence into the issuer and its securities if afforded sufficient access, the SEC
requires the filing of offering documents to relieve investors of this burden and to
allow capital to move more efficiently.227 Both in-house and outside counsel are
well-placed to ferret out information that potential investors cannot. 22 ' By not
seeking out this information prior to the time of the offering, lawyers shift the costs
of investigation to the investing public and ultimately make ex post litigation more
likely.
Third, to the extent that such a requirement would impose additional costs on
the issuer, these costs would be minimal compared to the wealth generated by most
public offerings. 229 Scholars have differed on whether investors in public offerings
rely on reputations of the law firms involved in the offerings in making investment
duty would not significantly impair the lawyer's duties to the client, and enforcement of the obligations
to the client are unlikely).
" See Warren, supra note 59, at 395.
224 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2013); see also id. R. 2.1 cmt. 1.
22 Lawyers have duties to their clients, themselves, and the greater public; conflicting
responsibilities between these should be resolved in favor of the client's legitimate interests while
maintaining respect for the other involved interests. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl.
(2013).
226 The SEC's Division of Corporate Finance selectively reviews corporate filings but specifically
disclaims that its review indicates that a disclosure is complete and accurate. See Division of
Corporation Finance: Fiing Review Process, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cffling
review.htm (last modified Sept. 22, 2014).
227 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2013) (providing that the SEC may consider interests such as efficiency,
competition, and capital formation in carrying out its duties); S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 1 (1933), reprinted
in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT of
1934, item no. 17 (comp. by Jack S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar, 1973) (noting that the purpose of
registration is to inform investors of the facts concerning the securities to be offered).
221 See MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 12.06[2]
(2005) ("[T]he SEC, with its limited resources, is particularly dependent on the probity and diligence of
the professionals who practice before it.") (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Bainbridge &Johnson, supra note 200, at 311.
229 For example, the average initial public offering in 2012, excluding Facebook, raised $180 million.
See Press Release, PWC, 2012 IPO Market Surpasses 2011, Despite Slowdown in Fourth Quarter
Activity, PwC Says (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/press-releases/2012/q4-ipo-watch-
press-release.jhtml.
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decisions,23 ° but imposing investigative duties on attorneys would allow investors to
more meaningfully gauge the significance of a particular law firm's involvement (or
lack thereof). Issuers that wish to minimize costs can also conduct offerings solely
via inside counsel. Increasing numbers of issuers are already conducting smaller
offerings without the assistance of outside counsel.231
Lastly, any harm to the attorney-client relationship is minimal because the
client is ultimately the issuer,232 not its managers or other employees. 233 Indeed,
when attorneys fail to investigate claims in offering documents with the overt or
tacit blessing of an issuer's managers, they ensure that other actors, such as the
issuer's board of directors, lack valuable information upon which they could
intercede to prevent violations of the securities laws.234 As noted, the SEC currently
obligates attorneys to report material violations of the securities laws to the issuer's
board under certain circumstances, 23" but this obligation will rarely arise if attorneys
do not seek to know whether their clients are complying with the securities laws.
236
230 Compare Patch Paczkowski & Majdi Anwar Quttainah, Law Firm Prestige as a Signal of
Value for Initial Public Offerings 3 (June 19, 2012), available athttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractjid=2087695 (finding that law firm prestige is negatively correlated with IPO underpricing),
with Jonathan Macey, The Demise of the Reputational Model in Capital Markets: The Problem of the
"Last Period Parasites," 60 SYRACUSE L. REv. 427, 436-37 (2010) (suggesting that the effect of law
firm reputation on the success of public offerings has greatly declined over time).
231 See Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation, 33 J.
CORP. L. 497, 498-99 (2008).
232 See supra Part II.A. (noting that in MBS offerings, the client is the depositor).
233 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2013). A related argument, voiced
extensively when the SEC first proposed requiring that attorneys who represent corporations "report up"
managerial wrongdoing, is that managers and other employees will be less likely to confide in the
corporation's attorney because they fear that counsel will go over their heads even when they are not
engaged in misconduct. See Bainbridge & Johnson, supra note 200, at 322 (citations omitted). These
concerns are overblown insofar as the manager always has the opportunity to retain his or her own
counsel and should do so when his or her interests are adverse to the corporation's. See MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 10 (2013) ('There are times when the organization's interest maybe
or become adverse to those of one or more of its constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer should
advise any constituent, whose interest the lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict
or potential conflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person
may wish to obtain independent representation.").
234 See Roiphe, supra note 4, at 211 ("It is hard to determine when to defer to the managers'
judgment and when the managers have conflicts that render them untrustworthy arbiters of the
organization's best interests. There is no hope, however, that an attorney can determine the client's
interest (let alone when the managers have abandoned it) if the managers are allowed to keep him, with
his own complicity, in the dark."); see also Bainbridge &Johnson, supra note 200, at 324-25 ("A legal
audit of [a] firm in connection with major transactions and/or the preparation of significant disclosure
documents would increase the likelihood that counsel would become aware of evidence of client
misconduct, which could then be reported up the ladder.").
235 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1), (3) (2014).
236 See Bainbridge &Johnson, supra note 200, at 321 (suggesting that lawyers will not comply with
the SEC's "reporting up" requirement because "absent the proverbial smoking gun, lawyers can be
expected to turn a blind eye to indicia of misconduct by those managers"). Bainbridge and Johnson also
suggest an explanation as to why attorneys might be prone to defer to managers even though a
corporation's managers are not the client. See generally id. at 306-07 (arguing that outside counsel is
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For all of these reasons, the SEC should require attorneys, after a reasonable
inquiry, to form a good faith belief that the offering documents they helped to
prepare contain no material representations or omissions. This obligation is
consistent with lawyers' traditional role as advisors and counselors to their clients 237
and, as set out in the next Section, follows from existing precedents.
B. Precedents for Imposing Due Diligence Obligations on Securities Attorneys
Despite disagreement as to whether attorneys who work on public offerings
owe duties directly to the public, prominent scholars and securities lawyers have
long considered it a fundamental part of the securities lawyer's role to investigate
claims made in offering documents.23 As Professor Coffee has explained, "Few
norms are less controversial among securities attorneys than that they should
perform some due diligence in preparing prospectuses or other disclosure
documents.
'23 9
Indeed, both the SEC and the ABA Committee of Ethics and Professional
Responsibility ("ABA Ethics Committee") have found that attorneys involved in a
securities offering have a professional responsibility to investigate an offering's
material facts. This duty is especially pronounced in the opinion letter context. For
example, a 1962 SEC release suggested that attorneys should not provide legal
opinions on whether securities offerings are exempt from registration under the
Securities Act without first undertaking an investigation. 240 The statement noted:
likely to treat management as the client because management controls whether outside counsel will
obtain future business and interacts with outside counsel on a day-to-day basis).
237 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2013). Attorney-client confidentiality also
presupposes that attorneys will make themselves aware of the facts of their clients' situations. See id. R.
1.6 cmt. 2; Gordon, supra note 2, at 1202-03 (noting the irony of attorneys criticizing mandatory
disclosure rules for discouraging communication between attorney and client while seeking to maintain
ignorance of clients' wrongdoing). If a lawyer learns during the course of an investigation that the
offering documents contain representations or material misrepresentations, the lawyer should resign
from the representation if the client refuses to make the appropriate corrections, but, the lawyer would
not have to reveal any client information. See 12 C.F.R. § 1014.3 (2013); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b), 1.13(b) (2013).
231 See James Cheek III, Professional Responsibility and Self-Regulation of the Securities Lawyer,
32 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 597, 629 (1975); Coffee, supra note 221, at 1310; Warren, supra note 59, at
388-90.
'9 Coffee, supra note 221, at 1310-11. Some scholars and practitioners have suggested that lawyers
should conduct a legal audit of disclosure documents. See, e.g., A.A. Sommer, Jr., The Emerging
Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, Address to the Banking, Corporation & Business Law Section
of the N.Y. State Bar Ass'n (Jan. 24, 1974), in LARRY D. SODERQUIST &THERESA A. GABALDON,
SECURITIES REGULATION, 617-19 (4th ed. 1999); Coffee, supra note 221, at 1314 (suggesting that
securities attorneys should be required to certify offering documents); Simon M. Lorne, The Corporate
and Securities Adviser, the Public Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MICH. L. REV. 423, 468-96
(1978). For a critique of the alleged lawyer/auditor dichotomy, see Kim, supra note 141, at 428-29.
" See Distribution by Broker-Dealers of Unregistered Securities, Securities Act Release No. 4445,
Exchange Act Release No. 6721, 1962 WL 69442, at *1 (Feb. 2, 1962) [hereinafter Broker-Dealers
Release].
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[A]n attorney's opinion based upon hypothetical facts is worthless if the facts are
not as specified, or if unspecified but vital facts are not considered. Because of this,
it is the practice of responsible counsel not to furnish an opinion concerning the
availability of an exemption from registration under the Securities Act for a
contemplated distribution unless such counsel have themselves carefully examined
all of the relevant circumstances and satisfied themselves, to the extent possible,
that the contemplated transaction is, in fact, not a part of an unlawful distribution.
Indeed, if an attorney furnishes an opinion based solely upon hypothetical facts
which [sic] he has made no effort to verify, and if he knows that his opinion will
be relied upon as the basis for a substantial distribution of unregistered securities,
a serious question arises as to the propriety of his professional conduct. 241
The professional obligation of securities attorneys to familiarize themselves with
the circumstances of the transactions on which they are opining exists
notwithstanding that they do not represent investors. 242
Commentators have claimed that there is a stark difference between a lawyer's
responsibilities in issuing legal opinions and preparing offering documents.2 43 But
the obligation to seek out facts extends beyond the opinion letter context. In In re
Ferguson, the SEC sanctioned an attorney who represented an issuer of municipal
bonds that was implicated in securities fraud. 244 Although there was no clear
evidence that the attorney knew that the prospectus for the bond offering contained
fraudulent statements, the SEC reasoned that: "Because of his review of the
prospectus .. . respondent should have known, if he did not know, that the
prospectus omitted material facts."245 The attorney entered into a consent decree
with the SEC, whereby his firm was required to, inter alia, "undertake an
appropriate investigation in connection with acting as bond counsel including,
among other things, obtaining independently-audited financial statements and
inquiring into the background of the various parties connected with the offering."246
Bond lawyers have since adopted standards of conduct that embrace their
investigative responsibilities. 247
The ABA has accepted the SEC's view that lawyers cannot rely on their
clients' representations in writing legal opinions with respect to the sale of
unregistered securities. 24s The relevant ABA Ethics Opinion stressed that:
It is ... [the responsibility of lawyers to] tompetently and carefully consider what
facts are relevant to the giving of the requested opinion and make a reasonable
241 Id. at *3.
242 See id. at *2.
243 See HAFT ET AL., supra note 213.
244 In re Ferguson, Securities Act Release No. 5523, 1974 WL 161489, at *1 (Aug. 21, 1974).
245 Id.
24 Id. at *2 n.3.
247 Warren, supra note 59, at 397-98; see also NAT'L ASSOC. OF BOND LAWYERS, THE
FUNCTION AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF BOND COUNSEL 41 (3d ed. 2011) ("Clearly,
an attorney participating in a transaction has a substantial duty to investigate the facts and circumstances
underlying that transaction.").
241 See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 335 (1974).
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inquiry to obtain such of those facts as are not within his personal knowledge....
[T]he lawyer may or may not need to go beyond directing questions to his client
and checking the answers by reviewing such appropriate documents as are
available. 49
The opinion also noted that while attorneys are not required to distrust their clients,
they should refrain from authoring opinions when they lacked "sufficient
confidence as to all the relevant facts."
250
This analysis was subsequently applied by the ABA to tax attorneys who opine
on the tax consequences of investments promoted by their clients. 25' The ABA
Ethics Committee found that, prior to issuing tax opinions to investors, tax lawyers
should seek to verify information submitted to them by their clients and "should
make reasonable inquiries to ascertain that a good faith effort has been expended to
comply with laws other than tax laws."252 If the disclosures in the offering materials
for the investment are insufficient, the tax lawyer must resign from the
representation.253
There is also significant authority that suggests that attorneys' failure to
investigate the representations in offering documents may constitute legal
malpractice.254 In FDIC v. OMelveny & Myers, the law firm of O'Melveny &
Myers failed to detect that its client was overvaluing assets by engaging in sham
transactions. 255 The offering memoranda it prepared for the client significantly
overstated the client's financial health.216 In reversing the lower court's summary
judgment motion in favor of O'Melveny, the Ninth Circuit held that the firm
should have undertaken a "reasonable, independent investigation" by, for example,
contacting its client's former auditors and law firm in the course of preparing the
offering memoranda.257 While O'Melveny has been criticized for imposing too
great a burden on an issuer's attorneys, s58 a number of courts have agreed with its
analysis of the securities attorney's role.
25 9
The duty to investigate is especially pronounced for attorneys who represent
participants in an offering that may be able to avail themselves of the "due
249 Id.
250 See id.
25' ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982).
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 See FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541, 1551 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying Colorado law); FDIC v.
O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1992) rev'd on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79, 89
(1994) (applying California law); Walco Invs., Inc. v. Thenen, 881 F. Supp. 1576, 1585-86 (S.D. Fla.
1995) (applying Florida law); In re Brooke Corp., 467 B.R. 513, 520-27 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2012)
(applying Kansas law).
25 See OMelveny, 969 F.2d at 746.
256 See id.
257 See id. -- 749.
258 See VAgI ET AL., supra note 213; Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-
Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 634 n.17
(1997) (suggesting that O'Melvenyis a curiosity).
259 See Broker-Dealers Release, supra note 240, at *3.
[Vol. 103
SUBPRIME SCRIVENERS
diligence" defense under Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act.26 ° In BarChris,
for example, the underwriters of a securities offering were held liable under Section
11 because the perfunctory investigation conducted by their counsel was
insufficient to sustain a due diligence defense.26' Commentators have acknowledge
the decision's significance for attorneys:
The implication arising from BarChris is that, if an underwriter is not able to
sustain its "due diligence" defense in an action under section 11 because it relied
upon its attorney as its agent and the attorney was not duly diligent, then the
underwriter is able to sue its attorney in malpractice under a negligence theory for
any damages which it might incur pursuant to a section 11 liability.262
To insulate themselves fully from malpractice claims, attorneys would be well
advised to investigate the claims in offering documents even if the client has not
expressly requested that they do so.
Finally, while this Article does not propose that attorneys should be liable for
aiding and abetting securities fraud under federal law if they fail to conduct a
reasonable inquiry into the claims made in offering documents, there is some
authority to suggest that liability should attach in these circumstances. 263 As
articulated by the district court in Felts.
The duty of the lawyer includes the obligation to exercise due diligence, including
a reasonable inquiry, in connection with responsibilities he has voluntarily
undertaken. A lawyer has no privilege to assist the [issuer] circulate statements
260 See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Many of the
MBS offerings discussed in Part II.B. involved the same law firm representing the depositor and
underwriter. A law firm is generally permitted to represent both an underwriter and issuer in the same
offering, particularly if informed consent is obtained from both parties. See N.Y. State Bar Assoc.
Comm. on Profl Ethics, Formal Op. 818 (2007). Nevertheless, such an arrangement is fraught with the
potential for conflicts of interest: Because the interests of an issuer and its underwriters may differ
during the course of an offering (e.g., on what disclosures are necessary), it is possible that a law firm
that currently represents both the underwriters and the issuer will be subject to "differing interests" that
would preclude accepting the assignment as Designated Underwriters' Counsel or require withdrawing
from it.
261 See BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 697.
262 Richard A. Aborn, Current Problems, "BarChris" and the Securities Act: Practical Responses for
Attorneys, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 360, 368 (1969). However, it should be noted that
underwriters' attorneys are not subject to the SEC's Standards of Conduct. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.1
(2014).
263 See SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968); Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen,
Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 660 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (D. Conn. 1987); Felts v. Nat'l Account Sys. Ass'n,
469 F. Supp. 54, 67-68 (N.D. Miss. 1978); BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 687; In re Carter & Johnson,
Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 1981 WVL 384414, at *5 n.21 (Feb. 28, 1981) [hereinafter Carter &
Johnson Release]; In re Fields, Securities Act Release No. 5404, 1973 WL 149285, at *3 n.20 (June 18,
1973). While these cases pre-date the Supreme Court's decision in Cent. Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994), the Supreme Court's conclusion that there is no
private cause of action for aiding and abetting securities law fraud does not affect these courts'
conclusions that lawyers should inquire into the claims made in offering documents.
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which he knows or should know to be false simply because they were furnished to
him by his client."
The SEC can, consistent with its statutory authority, hold lawyers to a higher
standard than merely avoiding aiding and abetting violations of the securities laws.
Based on the foregoing, the notion that attorneys should endeavor to verify
claims made in offering documents - even if not expressly required to do so by their
clients - is not starkly at odds with the traditional role of securities attorneys.
265
Indeed, this was essentially the position of the SEC until the late 1980S, 266 and, by
contrast, far more is expected of attorneys in other common law countries. 267 What
the subprime mortgage crisis illustrates, however, is that under prevailing SEC
regulations and market conditions, lawyers lack incentives to obtain information
that might lead them to doubt their clients' representations. By imposing
heightened duties on the attorneys who practice before it, the SEC would spur
attorneys to evaluate the propriety of the transactions they are facilitating before
filing offering documents with the Commission.
IV. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
This Article has sought to illustrate that attorneys involved in the issuance of
MBS and related financial products failed to determine whether originators were
lending responsibly. It has also sought to explain this failure. While it is impossible
to know whether attorneys could have mitigated the effects of the financial crisis by
insisting that their clients not proceed with MBS offerings unless the underlying
mortgages were sound, the financial crisis would not have occurred without
attorneys' facilitation of MBS and related offerings.
This Article has proposed that the SEC require that attorneys who appear
before it have a good faith belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, that the offering
documents they helped to prepare contain no material misrepresentations or
omissions. This ethical obligation can be inferred from the Model Rules'
264 Felts, 469 F. Supp. at 67; see also Walco Invs., Inc. v. Thenen, 881 F. Supp. 1576, 1586 (S.D.
Fla. 1996) ("While a law firm generally represents only its client, under certain situations, a duty may
arise to third parties whereby a law firm cannot merely be a conduit for its client's illegal activity.").
265 Even some critics of the SEC's Standards of Conduct have acknowledged this point. See Evan A.
Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1283 (2003)
(suggesting that the notion of the lawyer as gatekeeper is uncontroversial insofar as lawyers frequently
provide negative assurance opinions with respect to disclosure).
266 See Amendment to Rule 105(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, Securities Act Release
No. 7593, 1998 WL 729201, at *22-23 (Oct. 19, 1998) (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting) (claiming that
the SEC overreached in prominent actions against attorneys and has since retreated); Simon M. Lorne
& W. Hardy Callcott, Administrative Actions Against Lawyers Before the SEC, 50 BUS. LAW. 1293,
1303-04 (1995).
267 See Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1661 (2010) (noting that in
Australia and other common law countries lawyers work collaboratively with other gatekeepers to verify
disclosures and produce a written report attesting to the accuracy of the offering document).
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requirement that attorneys qua advisors "exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice."26
It is nevertheless the case that law firms might be more reluctant to work on
securities offerings if this Article's proposal is adopted. What constitutes a "good
faith belief' and how much due diligence on the part of the firm is sufficient to
constitute a "reasonable inquiry" will depend on the facts of each offering. It is
conceivable that some issuers will be deprived of counsel if law firms or their
insurers conclude that a particular offering is simply too risky.
Another possible objection to this Article's proposal is that it will not deter
violations of the securities laws. An issuer's officers and directors cannot be
expected to confide their intentions to commit securities fraud. A basic inquiry may
not reveal any wrongdoing, particularly as transactional attorneys are not trained
investigators. 269 Indeed, to truly uncover wrongdoing, attorneys might have to carry
out a fll legal audit, which would be time-consuming and very costly.27 These
objections are addressed in turn.
A. Will Firms Work on Securities Offerings?
The securities bar has often resisted the SEC's efforts to regulate it. For
example, the bar widely denounced the SEC's decision to prosecute the lawyers and
law firms involved in the disastrous merger between Interstate National
Corporation and National Student Marketing Corporation on the basis that the
lawyers had a duty to stop or rectify their clients' fraud.171 Until the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley, the ABA also thwarted proposals that would have provided for
up-the-ladder reporting of corporate fraud and other malfeasance. 72
SEC regulations that mandate that attorneys acquire a good faith belief after a
reasonable inquiry into the contents of offering documents may engender similar
apprehension. Such concerns are exacerbated by the ambiguity of regulations,
which require that attorneys have a "good faith belief' and conduct "reasonable
inquiries."
268 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2013).
2169 See Bainbridge & Johnson, supra note 200, at 321-26; Schwarcz, supra note 54, at 34
("[Structured finance] counsel cannot feasibly investigate for fraud in the way that a district attorney
would investigate.").
270 See Bainbridge &Johnson, supra note 200, at 324-26.
271 See Complaint, SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 430 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1977)
(No. 225-72) 1972 WL 296505 (C.C.H.); Kim, supra note 141, at 462-63; see also Koniak, supra note
14, at 1249 ("It is difficult to overstate the vehemence of the bar's reaction to the SEC complaint [in the
National Student Marketing case]; references to the return of King George were commonplace, and the
rhetoric suggested that the liberty of all Americans was at stake.").
272 See Bainbridge, supra note 141, at 914-15 (detailing the efforts of Professor Richard Painter and
others in advocating for up-the-ladder reporting). But see Koniak, supra note 14, at 1278 (claiming that
the final up-the-ladder reporting rule "looked tough, but wasn't").
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Of course, neither the National Student Marketing case, nor more recent
actions such as In Re Carter & Johnson,273 prevented large law firms from
participating in MBS and related securities offerings. Given the lucrative nature of
much securities work, most firms are likely to continue to work on securities
offerings and will not be dissuaded from doing so by the theoretical possibility of
SEC discipline. This stands to reason irrespective of an offering's complexity.
274
There is, moreover, a substantial body of case law that sets out what constitutes
reasonable due diligence in the context of a securities offering, which can be used to
inform attorneys' duties of inquiry.271 For example, the lawyers who worked on
MBS offerings for WaMu and other financial institutions should have certainly
reviewed any pre-existing reports concerning the loans they were securitizing
2 7 6
The unlikelihood that issuers will be deprived of outside counsel is also
illustrated by the impact of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on
litigation in the federal courts. After Rule 11 was amended in 1983 to require that
attorneys undertake a reasonable pre-filing inquiry before bringing suit, some
commentators claimed that the amended rule would have a chilling effect on
attorneys, particularly in unpopular actions.277 These concerns seem overstated in
retrospect, especially after the Rule was amended again to its current form.2 78 What
273 See In re Carter &Johnson Release, supra note 263, at *5.
274 Since complex transactions are bound to generate more fees, attorneys will likely participate in
them even if they calculate that the likelihood of discipline is somewhat higher because of uncertainty as
to the proper amount of due diligence.
21 Some decisions pertain to the due diligence defense under the Securities Act, see In re Software
Toolworks Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 621-24 (9th Cir. 1994); Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1361-62 (5th
Cit. 1981); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064, 1071 (7th Cit. 1975), whereas others
specifically pertain to lawyers' responsibilities in reviewing offering documents. See generally ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982) (discussing tax shelter investment
offerings).
• 276 Cf FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (suggesting that law firms
should have reviewed previous audits to ascertain issuer's financial condition prior to finalizing the
offering documents).
277 See generally William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Rule 11 - A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181, 184-85 (1985) (assessing amendments to Rule 11 and noting that "imposing sanctions on
lawyers for their conduct of litigation raises the specter of chilling advocacy"); Georgene M. Vairo,
Commentary, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 484-85
(1991) (arguing on the basis of empirical research that Rule 11 sanctions are primarily levied against
plaintiffs in "disfavored lawsuits" such as employment discrimination and civil rights cases).
271 Professor Spiegel's survey of the empirical literature on Rule 11 raises doubt, for example, that
civil rights cases have been disproportionately affected as has been commonly alleged: "The Rule 11
studies are suggestive but not conclusive. It is not merely that they suffer from methodological problems.
More significantly, even if we accept the conclusion that civil rights cases have been disproportionately
singled out for disparate treatment, we still must interpret what that means." Mark Spiegel, The Rule 11
Studies and Civil Rights Cases: An Inquiry into the Neutrality of Procedural Rules, 32 CONN. L. REV.
155, 206 (1999). One possibility is that more frivolous actions are brought in these types of actions or
that counsel lacks the funds to litigate motions for sanctions. See Paul D. Carrington & Andrew
Wasson, A Reflection on Rulemaking: The Rule 11 Experience, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 563, 570-71
(2004); see also Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Ending Illegitimate Advocacy Reinvigorating Rule 11 Through
Enhancement of the Ethical Duty to Report, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1555, 1576 (2001) (suggesting that
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the revisions to Rule 11 seem to have done, however, is force attorneys to "stop and
think" before proceeding with baseless actions. 79 This Article's proposal may have
a similarly beneficial effect by making it less likely that public securities offerings
will proceed without offering documents first being subject to some due diligence
by the issuer's attorneys.
If an issuer does not believe that the cost of retaining outside counsel to assist
with a public offering is justified or cannot find a firm that is willing to assist with a
certain offering, it can conduct a public offering with the assistance of its in-house
counsel or choose to raise capital through private placements. 250 Imposing
heightened duties on attorneys involved in public securities offerings is not
unreasonable281 simply because some issuers might find it more difficult to access
the capital markets and others would prefer to pay their attorneys less. 282
B. The Deterrence of Securities Fraud
Another possible objection to this Article's proposal is that attorneys, especially
outside attorneys, are poorly equipped to deter their clients' wrongdoing. 283 Under
this view, imposing heightened duties on securities attorneys may increase the costs
of securities offerings without providing attendant benefits.
As an initial matter, although this Article has focused chiefly on outside
counsel who were primarily responsible for preparing MBS for WaMu and other
financial institutions, the proposed rule will also apply to in-house counsel in
certain circumstances. For example, in-house counsel "practice[e] before the
[SEC]" and are subject to its standards of conduct when they provide advice on the
securities laws to an issuer in connection with a public offering.
284
In any event, this Article does not presuppose that outside attorneys will be
able to detect and prevent securities fraud singlehandedly. They will have a higher
subsequent amendments, particularly the creation of a "safe harbor," have made Rule 11 far less
efficacious in deterring frivolous actions).
279 See Carrington & Wasson, supra note 278, at 567; Melissa L. Nelken, The Impact of Federal
Rule 11 on Lawyers and Judges in the Northern District of California, 74 JUDICATURE 147, 149-50,
(1990).
28 As noted infra Part IV.B., while in-house counsel may also fall under the proposed regulation,
they presumably have a far better understanding of their organization's business and would not need to
engage in as extensive due diligence as outside counsel.
21 Professor Schwarcz appears to be of this view. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 34 (suggesting
that imposing heightened duties on attorneys in public securities offerings will have negative economic
effects).
2"2 One of the virtues of this Article's proposal from the perspective of an attorney is that attorneys
would likely be able to charge more for assisting with securities offerings given the amount of time
required to review the representations in the offering documents.
283 See Bainbridge & Johnson, supra note 200, at 321 ("Managers who intentionally commit fraud
or breaches of fiduciary duty will only rarely consult their legal counsel."); Gilson, supra note 19, at 914-
15; David McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot? A Modest Proposal to Grant Immunity to Lawyers
Who Disclose Client Financial Misconduct, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1825, 1832-33 (2004) (suggesting that
attorneys' disclosure costs will often exceed the expected benefits).
214 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(1)(iii) (2014).
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capacity to detect fraud, however, when they work closely with in-house counsel
and compliance personnel." 5 Indeed, by inquiring into the claims made in offering
documents, outside attorneys are likely to make contact with individuals within the
issuer who can alert outside counsel to potential fraud and illegality. Even brief
conversations with Risk Management personnel might have alerted WaMu's
outside attorneys to the recklessness of WaMu's lending.
Moreover, not all violations of the securities laws are the product of conscious
wrongdoing. As Professor Langevoort has observed:
[A] firm's managers may well have come to believe in good faith (a cognitively-
loaded legal construct, to be sure) that no risk or problem is big enough to worry
about, while an outside observer in possession of the same information would
disagree. As one organizational behaviorist has said, "[o]nce you've been in water
long enough[,] you no longer perceive you're in water. ""'
Outside counsel can deter corporate wrongdoing by providing an outside
perspective and notifying managers of risks that they may not have fully
appreciated.287 To fulfill this role, however, attorneys must first be willing to inform
themselves about their clients' businesses.
Even if attorneys cannot be expected to interdict securities fraud and other
illegality in most cases, the SEC would nevertheless be justified to impose
heightened investigative duties on attorneys who practice before it. This is because
SEC regulations and ethics rules already contemplate that attorneys will act as
gatekeepers by, for example, reporting breaches of fiduciary duty, fraud, and
criminal conduct up-the-ladder in certain circumstances. 288 These regulations
cannot be effective if attorneys do not investigate the representations in their
clients' offering documents and otherwise seek to understand their clients'
businesses. This Article's proposed regulation should not be considered in isolation
from attorneys' existing obligations under the SEC's Standards of Conduct.
It also does not follow that because attorneys cannot always prevent securities
fraud that they should be entitled to facilitate and profit from it. Past corporate
scandals such as Enron have damaged the reputation of the legal profession,
notwithstanding the Enron attorneys' protestations that they were ignorant of the
true nature of their clients' actions.289 Attorneys involved in the issuance of MBS
2. See Symposium, supra note 140, at 528.
286 Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper's Guide to
the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk-Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 1209, 1213-14
(2011) (quote alteration in original) (citation omitted).
287 See id. at 1214.
211 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1), (3) (2014); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b), (c)
(2013); Zacharias, supra note 214, at 1389 ("Lawyers are gatekeepers and always have been....
[E]veryone will agree that lawyers are clients' agents and that lawyers' traditional role in the adversary
system is to help clients pursue lawful goals .... That, however, is quite different from saying that
lawyers should do whatever clients want.. ").
289 See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1193-94; Koniak, supra note 14, at 1278 (claiming that post-
Enron, the SEC was empowered to hold lawyers to account).
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and other related securities were able to reap tremendous profits from MBS and
CDOs even though they appear to have conducted minimal due diligence into
originators' lending practices, and the securities ultimately became toxic. That
attorneys may not have known with certainty that originators were using shoddy
lending practices does not change the fact that they enabled and profited from the
securitization of mortgages that should have never been marketed and sold to
investors.
290
CONCLUSION
Scholars have long expressed skepticism that attorneys are able to fulfill the
gatekeeping responsibilities that are imposed on them by ethics rules and regulatory
bodies such as the SEC.2 9' This Article has shown that this skepticism is largely
justified through its examination of the work of attorneys involved in the issuance
of MBS and related securities during the subprime era. What differentiates the
subprime mortgage crisis from previous corporate scandals, however, is the sheer
number of firms and attorneys involved on all sides of MBS, CDOs, and related
transactions, and that they collectively failed to ascertain the poor quality of the
mortgages that were being securitized.
This Article does not dispute that attorneys are entitled to aid their clients in
achieving legal ends. Nor does this Article claim that "willful ignorance" can never
be ethically justified. Even scholars who have argued that willful ignorance should
not relieve lawyers from professional discipline have acknowledged that exceptions
might be justified in certain representations."' However, in the context of securities
practice, where offering documents are largely prepared for the benefit of investors,
and where authorities have long intimated that attorneys are professionally
obligated to verify their contents,293 an explicit obligation on the part of attorneys
who practice before the SEC to conduct their own inquiries and not rely solely
upon their clients' assurances will make it more likely that investors will receive
accurate information and will not unduly interfere with the relationship between an
issuer and its attorneys.
294
In the current era, law firms must compete intensely for the business of
corporate clients such as large financial institutions.2 95 Lawyers are consequently
290 In this sense, lawyers were unjustly enriched by their involvement in MBS offerings. See Szulik v.
Tagliaferri, 966 F. Supp. 2d 339, 348, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (refusing to dismiss unjust enrichment
claims brought by the beneficiaries of trust against attorney who received fees for structuring fraudulent
transactions in which the trust invested).
29 See Bainbridge &Johnson, supra note 200, at 306-07; Gilson, supra note 19, at 914-15; Kim,
supra note 141, at 462-63.
292 See Roiphe, supra note 4, at 204.
293 See supra Part III.B.
294 The attorney-client relationship could in fact be strengthened if the attorney's advice ultimately
prevents the client from embarking on a disastrous course of conduct.
295 See Henderson, supra note 200, at 381; see also Bainbridge &Johnson, supra note 200, at 306
(describing law firms as "something akin to [] fungible good[s]").
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inclined to defer to their clients unless there is clear, perhaps incontrovertible,
evidence of wrongdoing.296 As corporate clients grow in both sophistication and
bargaining power, they may be able to entirely cabin off attorneys from information
that might cast doubt on the legality of their actions. Often corporate clients can
justify these actions as cost-saving.297
The SEC can simply allow these processes to continue while maintaining the
pretense that attorneys will, inter alia, encourage their clients to make disclosures in
offering documents that their clients would rather not make. Alternatively,
attorneys can be incentivized to inform themselves about representations in offering
documents so that they are able to independently evaluate whether the offerings
that they are facilitating comply with the securities laws.
More vigilant lawyering may not have prevented the recent financial crisis.
However, attorneys who see their role solely in terms of "papering the deal" are not
advisors and counselors to their clients, but well- compensated scriveners. The
SEC and lawyers who practice before it would do well to repudiate this model of
lawyering.
296 See Bainbridge &Johnson, supra note 200, at 321; Koniak, supra note 14, at 1275-76.
297 Professor Henderson writes approvingly of Cisco that, for example, pledges to save costs by
using technology to answer many legal questions generated by employees and pressuring outside counsel
to 'do more with less." See Henderson, supra note 200, at 383-84. While minimizing legal costs is
dearly beneficial in many circumstances, such a system may keep the company from learning of
significant legal problems until it is too late. Even sophisticated legal departments can underestimate the
degree of legal exposure the company may have and in-house attorneys often have incentives to defer to
management. See Bainbridge & Johnson, supra note 200, at 306 (suggesting that a general counsel's
tenure depends on his or her relationship with the CEO); Langevoort, supra note 4, at 504-05
(suggesting that, prior to the financial crisis, in-house counsel at financial firms likely needed a high
tolerance for risk in order to advance). Requiring outside counsel to "do more with less" also lowers the
likelihood that outside counsel will uncover wrongdoing.
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